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ZONING CYBERSPACE: PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL
UPSIDE DOWN
Raymond H. Brescia*
[I]n the beginning, all the world was America.1
Abstract
Over fifty years ago, Charles Reich posited that we should extend
property protections to what he would call “government largess”: that
array of interests—from licenses to welfare benefits—that often form the
bases for one’s economic existence in the modern world. Reich considered
such protections essential to the preservation of individual autonomy, the
independence that is critical to a functioning democracy. Today, our most
personal information and even our thoughts, as reflected in our online
activities and digital existence, are subject to “private largess.” Private
entities possess information central to the identity of those individuals who
utilize their services. This information exists in a digital “upside down,”
to borrow a phrase from popular culture: an almost parallel universe or
shadow world where our most intimate details are open to inspection and
acquisition by third parties without our informed consent. Indeed, only a
relatively weak set of institutions stand in the way, if they offer any
resistance at all, to the sharing of such information by these entities in
ways that undermine what I refer to throughout this piece as the integrity
of identity: what should be a protected sphere of personal interests,
desires, affiliations, and even our beliefs that make up the self. As we face
calls for greater surveillance in the throes of the novel coronavirus (SARSCoV-2) crisis, concerns that privacy protections will further erode loom
large. Moreover, any crisis-intervention measures may never be rolled
back when the acute crisis dissipates.
While much privacy scholarship focuses on the personal, individual,
and private rights such risks to privacy entail, I will focus on the dangers
*
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JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 49 (Project Gutenberg, 2010)
(1689).
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these threats pose to democracy by undermining the integrity of identity
and the collective goods that democracy produces. In a landmark article,
Calabresi and Melamed argued that we should protect different
entitlements through those rules that produce desired results in society,
including solving collective action problems. They would classify these
different approaches as either property, liability, or alienability rules. This
Article draws from and builds upon the work of Reich, Calabresi, and
Melamed to argue that, as in several property law contexts, from the
mortgage market to zoning, where we use what I call “hybrid” rules—
rules that combine elements of property, liability and alienability
approaches—to solve collective action problems, we should see the
problem of privacy in the digital world as a collective action problem that
requires similar, hybrid solutions. Indeed, this Article argues for a form
of what I call digital zoning that utilizes all three approaches in the
Calabresi and Melamed taxonomy through hybrid rules to help preserve
privacy, autonomy, and self-determination in the digital world.
INTRODUCTION
On the eve of the American Revolution, when the British controlled the official
postal system, the mails were neither protected nor private.2 British officials could
read the letters and newspaper tracts that they transported through the official postal
system.3 Because of the threat to the privacy of their correspondence, many rebel
colonists feared punishment should they express sentiments, in writing, in favor of
independence.4 Moreover, printers at the time, both Tory and rebel, were subject to
violence by angry mobs. When British forces occupied Boston, several printers were
referred to as “trumpeters of sedition” who should be “put to the sword” if found by
British troops.5 To evade British oversight, correspondents used private messengers
to circumvent the official postal system.6 At the urging of a newspaper publisher
from Baltimore who had started a private route between that city and Philadelphia,
agitators in Boston advocated for the creation of a new communications network
throughout the colonies that was independent of the official British one.7 They
argued that the cost associated with the official system was a tax that lined the coffers
of the British government, that British surveillance of their correspondence chilled
freedom of thought and expression, and that an independent postal system would
2
Joseph M. Adelman, “A Constitutional Conveyance of Intelligence, Public and
Private”: The Post Office, the Business of Printing, and the American Revolution, 11 ENTER.
& SOC’Y 709, 717 (2010).
3
Id.
4
See id.
5
JOHN BYRNE COOKE, REPORTING THE WAR: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 13–14 (2008).
6
See Adelman, supra note 2, at 718.
7
Id. at 724.
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foster a more cohesive colonial body.8 When the Continental Congress met in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1775, before even voting for independence, it created
a new postal system called the Constitutional Post, with routes from Maine to
Georgia, naming Benjamin Franklin as the first postmaster general.9
Without the ability to communicate privately and engage in collective action,
to identify themselves as revolutionaries, to claim a new American identity, and to
communicate all of that information securely and with other like-minded people, the
world-historical acts that brought about American independence might have never
occurred. 10 Today, protesters around the world are nervous that their identity,
reflected in their online and analog activity, will be utilized to oppress them and
suppress efforts to nurture democracy and the realization of self-determination.11 A
dramatic public health crisis is already generating even greater surveillance
measures, and these are unlikely to be scaled back once the crisis subsides.12
This historical record reveals that threats to privacy and the integrity of identity
threaten democracy. This integrity of identity—the maintenance of a private sphere
of information that is central to our core sense of self—is critical to the pursuit of
both individual and collective self-determination.13 Moreover, essential benefits
8

Id. at 733–36.
Id. at 739.
10
See 2 DAVID RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 405–10
(Liberty Fund, Inc. 1990) (1789) (highlighting the role of the press in turning the public’s
sentiments against Great Britain’s offers of conciliation during the American Revolution).
11
As just one example of this phenomenon, agitation and surveillance related to both
analog and digital identities have come together in Hong Kong, as both sides in the street
protests are using facial recognition software to monitor opponents’ activities. Paul Mozur,
In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognitionsurveillance.html [https://perma.cc/VM8K-XHZB]. Of course, it is not just protesters that
are concerned about their digital privacy. Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson,
Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar, & Erica Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned,
Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov. 15, 2019) (showing majority of Americans concerned about digital privacy).
12
Iain Marlow, Virus Hands World Leaders Sweeping Powers They May Never Give
Up, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0325/virus-gives-world-leaders-sweeping-powers-they-may-never-give-up [https://perma.cc/
5MX9-9C58].
13
Here, I use the term “integrity” not in the sense that one maintains a consistent set of
personal values, but rather that a condition, like identity, is complete or unimpaired. See
Integrity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrity
[https://perma.cc/66ZT-9R56] (last visited June 17, 2020); cf. Andrew B. Ayers, The HalfVirtuous Integrity of Atticus Finch, 86 MISS. L.J. 33, 34 (2017) (distinguishing between the
integrity of identity—understood as the psychological coherence of the self—and moral
integrity—understood as consistency with one’s moral values). And while there is some
overlap between identity in the way in which I am using it and the term “identity politics,”
the sense that one can associate one’s identity with a particular racial, ethnic, or other group,
9
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accrue from the preservation of the individual’s integrity of identity because of the
central role that such integrity plays in framing and interpreting grievances and
injustices,14 collective meaning-making,15 the realization of self-determination, the
creation of social capital and societal trust, and the bringing about of social change.
More than fifty years ago, before the advent of the digital age, Charles Reich
argued for the extension of property protections to an array of interests—from
licenses to welfare benefits—that often serve as the basis of one’s economic
existence in the modern world.16 Such interests, what he described as government
“[b]enefits, subsidies, and privileges,”17 were subject to the whims of a capricious
government, or “government largess,”18 that would lead individuals in society to
“[s]eek[] to stay on the safe side of an uncertain, often unknowable line . . . .”19
Those “dependent on largess” were “likely to eschew any activities that might incur
official displeasure,” and would “fear to offend, lest ways and means be found, in
the obscure corners of discretion, to deny these favors in the future.”20 For Reich, to
protect the integrity of individual autonomy, the recognition of property rights in
such interests was essential not only to preserve personal liberty but also to maintain
democracy.21

and such identification can lead to collective mobilization activated by that identity, I am
speaking more consciously about how identity and the integrity of identity are closely
associated with individual notions of the self. For a criticism of so-called identity politics,
see MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 58–59 (2017)
(decrying as divisive what is described as identity politics); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY:
THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT, loc 2215 (Kindle ed. 2019)
(criticizing identity politics as practiced on the left and the right as “deeply problematic”
because it utilizes aspects of identity which are described as fixed). But cf. Stacey Y. Abrams,
Identity Politics Strengthens Democracy, 98 FOREIGN AFFS. 160, 163 (2019) (arguing that
by “embracing identity and its prickly, uncomfortable contours, Americans will become
more likely to grow as one”).
14
On the relationship between grievance interpretation, identity, and what are known
as collective-action frames, see David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and
Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 136–38 (Aldon D.
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
15
Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983)
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning.”).
16
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785–86 (1964).
17
Id. at 749.
18
See id. at 734–39. While largess can certainly have positive connotations, Reich saw
that the growth of government largess and its reach into virtually every corner of the
economy had serious ramifications for individual autonomy, leading to a dependency on the
whims of the government for wealth and well-being. See id. at 771.
19
Id. at 751.
20
Id.
21
See id. at 771–74.
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Today, our most personal information and even our thoughts, as reflected in
our online activities and digital existence, are subject to “private largess.” Private
entities possess highly personal and private information about us and can share it
with relative impunity. Like the fears expressed by Reich of the perniciousness of
government largess, this cache of seemingly private information in possession of
private entities leaves many individuals at the mercy of these entities in terms of
how they use such information and with whom they share it. This information exists
in a digital “upside down,” an almost parallel universe or shadow world where our
most intimate details are open to inspection and acquisition by third parties without
our consent, or with an extremely thin form of consent that is secured without a full
appreciation for the scope of information known about us and how it may be used.22
These threats to privacy undermine the integrity of identity: that sphere of personal
interests, desires, affiliations, and beliefs that make up the self.23 Yet it is the self,
the individual, that stands at the center of liberal democracies, making both
individual and collective self-determination possible; reflexively, both types of selfdetermination are central to democracy as well.24 The products of these forms of
self-determination are often public and collective goods, including the democratic
form of government itself.25 But these products are under threat due to the risks
22

In the Netflix original series Stranger Things, the “Upside Down” is described as an
“alternate reality existing in parallel to the human world.” The Upside Down, STRANGER
THINGS WIKI, http://strangerthings.wikia.com/wiki/The_Upside_Down [https://perma.cc/3T
98-S8BY] (last visited June 17, 2020). Venture capitalist Roger McNamee has used similarly
colorful language to describe the information technology companies collect as “data voodoo
dolls,” the “digital profiles they develop for each user.” Brian Barth, Big Tech’s Big Defector,
THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/02/bigtechs-big-defector [https://perma.cc/2QCV-R9JQ]. Technology reporter Farhad Manjoo
recently described a day in which he could see how much of his digital activities were tracked
in “obscene detail,” proclaiming that “[t]his is happening every day, all the time, and the
only reason we’re O.K. with it is that it’s happening behind the scenes, in the comfortable
shadows.” Farhad Manjoo, I Visited 47 Websites. Hundreds of Trackers Followed Me, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/23/opinion/data-internet-privacytracking.html [https://perma.cc/96R4-GUCQ] (last visited June 22, 2020). See also JOSEPH
TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR
IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 79 (2011) (“The rise of a market in impressions has naturally
stimulated unprecedented data-collecting activity related to individuals.”).
23
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (2d ed.
1998) (describing the “more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken
together partly define the person I am”).
24
On the interplay between collective self-determination and individual autonomy and
identity, see Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF.
L. REV. 429, 439–42 (1998). On the role of digital privacy in preserving individual
autonomy, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 563–64 (1995). On the
relationship between individual and collective self-determination, see infra Part I.A.
25
Public goods scholarship often fails to distinguish between, and blends the concepts
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posed by a lack of digital privacy in the hands of private actors. As with Reich’s
concerns over the risks posed to privacy, autonomy, and self-determination by
unchecked government largess, there is an equal, if not greater, concern associated
with the risks posed by private largess to individual autonomy and democratic selfgovernance. 26 This Article’s normative claim is that we should consider setting rules
concerning digital privacy that will offer greater protections for certain types of
activities that lend themselves to these public and collective goods: a form of “digital
zoning” that will attempt to protect the integrity of identity and preserve the central
role it plays in the formation of personal identity, the preservation of which is
essential to any functioning democracy.27
Given the critical importance of the integrity of identity to the functioning of
democracies, it is appropriate to consider the legal institutions in place that presently
guard this integrity against the whims of private largess to determine whether they
are adequate to such a weighty task. Traditionally, the integrity of identity has been
protected by a collection of privacy-based protections through what are generally
considered liability rules.28 Liability rules provide remedies focused on addressing
harms that affect individuals.29 These rules mostly offer relief for breaches of
privacy through ex post damage awards to individual victims of such infractions.30
Yet, in many ways, we often conceptualize privacy as something that inures to
of, “public goods” and “collective goods,” but I choose to use the term collective goods to
refer to the goods that come from collective action, which often begin by benefiting the
members of the collective enterprise and can have spillover effects on the broader
community. For a discussion of collective goods and public goods that views them as mostly
interchangeable, see PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 227–31 (1995). This is similar to the use of the term “club
goods” in some scholarship; these are the benefits that are derived from membership in a
group that shares the burdens of the production of goods and only members share in those
benefits. For a discussion of club goods, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 347–51 (2d ed. 1996). For a
discussion of public goods, like civil rights, that are a product of collective action, see
DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2–4 (1991).
26
On Reich’s views of government largess, see infra Part II.B.
27
See infra Part IV.
28
Here, I explicitly borrow from Calabresi and Melamed’s taxonomy of rules that
govern the protection of different interests. See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (articulating liability rules as a concept protecting entitlements).
29
See id. at 1092. For a discussion of privacy’s individualistic focus, see Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128–33 (2007).
30
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092. As I will show throughout this piece,
however, privacy is often protected by more than liability rules alone. See, e.g., Matthew B.
Kugler & Thomas H. Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade Secret and Fourth Amendment
Expectations, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1223, 1235–39 (discussing the interrelationship between
privacy, trespass, and property protections).
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individuals, even though threats to digital privacy pose problems for collective
action and the public goods that privacy generates: social capital, societal trust, and
social change that emanates from social movements.31 Moreover, entities with
access to private information about those utilizing digital services are largely free to
share this information broadly, and for profit. This is the private largess problem,
and it arises as a result of several phenomena, which together create a form of moral
hazard: a virtually lawless space in which rent-seeking is likely. Such phenomena
include the following: asymmetry of information regarding the purposes and uses of
private information; opacity in waiver rules related to those purposes and uses; and
legislative and adjudicative immunity for breaches of different aspects of privacy,
particularly in the online space.32 For these reasons, the providers of a wide array of
modern technologies have largely avoided responsibility for the most serious
breaches of privacy and threats to identity that arise today.33 Generally speaking,
lawlessness, impunity, and the collective harms they create result in a collective
action problem, requiring a collective solution. As a result, strategies to address these
threats must see the problem as such: a collective action problem that requires
collective—rather than individualized and atomistic—solutions.34
In a highly influential article, Calabresi and Melamed argue that legal disputes
surrounding different types of legal interests can trigger collective action problems.35
As a result, different types of rules should be deployed to regulate such interests in
different contexts.36 Similarly, given the collective action problem posed by the
private largess phenomenon, it is appropriate to question whether the current privacy
law regime, centered around liability rules alone, can protect the digital preserve of
information that can reflect, if not constitute, one’s identity and explore whether
more robust property rules, coupled with inalienability rules, are better suited to
promote and protect the integrity of identity that is essential to self-determination
and the functioning of democracy.37
While some legal scholarship discusses the potential role that property rules
could play in preserving individual privacy, rarely does such scholarship address the
collective dimensions of privacy and the role privacy protections can play in
promoting collective action.38 In recent years, we have learned more about the
31

See infra Part II.C.
For a discussion of the different types of immunity granted to business entities in
their digital activities, see infra Part III.A.
33
See infra Part II.A.
34
See infra Part III.C.
35
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1089–93.
36
See infra Part I.C.
37
On the notion of privacy “preserves,” see Erving Goffman, The Territories of the
Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28, 38–40 (1971).
Reich would call for protection of property interests through “sanctuaries or enclaves where
no majority can reach.” Reich, supra note 16, at 787.
38
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815,
834–36 (2000) (arguing privacy protections are “constitutive” of society but not discussing
32
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threats to digital privacy and the potential ramifications they have for selfdetermination and democracy.39 With greater knowledge of the threats to the
integrity of identity as these threats unfold in real-time, and with a greater focus on
not just the public good of privacy but also the collective goods it generates, this
Article offers theoretical, historical, and practical support for the notion that the
conjoined interests in privacy and the integrity of identity should enjoy stronger
protection than what presently exists. It will examine several fundamental areas
where the applicable rules blend concepts more prevalent in liability systems with
those of traditional property law to address critical collective action problems to
assess whether they might be useful and effective in protecting privacy in private
law settings.40 Indeed, I argue that these hybrid approaches—used at present in the
landlord-tenant, mortgage, zoning, and restrictive covenant contexts of property
law—can serve the privacy domain well. This Article will explore how we might
utilize similar hybrid approaches to preserve the integrity of identity.
With these goals in mind, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I will review
the origins of contemporary property law and show how early theorists often tied
the importance of protecting property to notions of the self.41 Despite this apparent
connection, what we have come to know as the right to privacy did not emerge until
the late 19th century. The effort to recognize this right was, in many ways, a product
of an explicit attempt to decouple it from property protections.42 After tracing the
emergence of this right to privacy in the late 19th century, this Part will then identify
the extent to which the current approach to privacy is mostly governed by liability
rules as opposed to property or inalienability rules.43 Part II will then ask whether,
in light of contemporary technologies and the threat they pose to the integrity of
identity, the time is right to rethink whether liability rules alone are sufficient to
protect privacy, the integrity of identity, and the collective goods they generate. It
will introduce the notion of private largess described earlier: the idea that much of
our online presence is protected mostly at the whim of private entities, with few
effective protections to ensure the integrity of identity. It goes on to argue that, given
the nature of privacy interests and the critical role they play in generating collective
goods (i.e., identity formation, social capital, social movements, and democracy), a
new regime, one informed by more robust rules, is appropriate for the preservation
of the integrity of identity. Part III then explores some of the ways that property and
inalienability rules have been invoked to preserve property interests in several
settings that might help inform the search for approaches to ensure the effective
protection of the integrity of identity. Part IV then describes the contours of a hybridthe public goods that privacy generates or the role privacy plays in collective action); Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013) (describing
importance of privacy to democracy).
39
See infra Part II.C.
40
See infra Part IV.
41
See infra Part I.A.
42
See infra Part I.B.
43
See infra Part 1.C.
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rules-informed regime for the protection of privacy, examining ways that hybrid
liability-property-inalienability rules—centered around a form of digital zoning—
might preserve the integrity of identity.
I. PROTECTING AUTONOMY
Threats to individual autonomy, no matter their source, threaten democracy.44
Protections that maintain this autonomy are central to the search for the self that is
essential to any effort to achieve true self-determination.45 A deep connection
between individual autonomy, democracy, and property has long existed in Western
political thought.46 This Part explores the emergence and evolution of this
connection.
A. The Connections Between Identity, the Self, and Property in Early Property
Theory and Its Relationship to Contemporary Thought
Foreshadowing what would become the Kantian principle that the individual
should be treated as an end and not a means,47 Locke would stake out what is often
referred to as the labor theory of property. When one mixes his or her labor with a
thing, like a field, the fruit of that mixture becomes the individual’s property.48 For
Locke, “[t]he labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his.”49 When the individual “removes [something] out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”50 Locke believed that we are not
truly free if the things we do with our bodies do not become our own.51 In many
ways, this thinking says much about property theory—where it has become highly
44

On the relationship between self-determination and liberal democracy, see Daniel
Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 352, 355–58 (1995).
45
See Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of
Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 408 (2009)
(“Participation in a democracy requires individuals to have an underlying capacity for selfdetermination, which requires some personal privacy.”).
46
See Post, supra note 24, at 439–42 (discussing the interplay between collective selfdetermination and individual autonomy).
47
IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 18
(Thomas Abbot trans., Project Gutenberg 10th ed. 2018) (1785) (expressing injunction to
treat all individuals as ends and not means). Charles Fried would use similar language with
respect to privacy—that it is an end in itself, and not just a means to an end. Charles Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968).
48
LOCKE, supra note 1, ¶ 27.
49
Id.
50
Id. See also Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information
Control, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 365, 367–68 (1998) (describing Lockean theory of property
acquisition).
51
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 27.
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influential in modern thought—but also about the self. The self is free to act, and the
product of any such act or acts become the property of the self.52 In these ways,
Locke would not just argue for recognition of the individual as an end and not a
means, but also that the product of the self’s actions should become his or her own
as a result.53 The recognition of the capacity to, by one’s own labor, come into
possession of a thing was, in fact, a recognition of the inviolate nature of the self:
that the individual could not become a means to the ends of another and that he or
she enjoyed a degree of autonomy to act and acquire and pursue the objects of the
self’s desire.54 This autonomy would find its way into public relations. Government,
according to Locke, “cannot take from any man any part of his property without his
consent . . . .”55 Since individuals “enter into societ[ies]” with governments for “the
preservation of [their] property,”56 Locke would claim that it would be “too gross an
absurdity” to have a government that deprived them of that very property.57 For these
reasons, “[m]en . . . in society hav[e] property, [which means that] they have such a
right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath
a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent
. . . .”58 As Locke would argue, every individual is entitled to “that equal right, that
every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or
authority of any other man.”59
These notions of the self, property, and autonomy are engrained in the civic
republicanism of the founders,60 who believed that one of the main reasons for
protecting property, which was at risk under an imperial rule from across the
Atlantic, was the autonomy it afforded the individual. In turn, such property enabled
the individual to participate in the processes of democracy.61 The economic security
52

See, e.g., E. J. Hundert, The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke Between Ideology
and History, 33 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 9 (1972) (describing Locke’s view that “[o]ne’s property
was the extension of self by virtue of the injection of personality into nature through work”).
53
Despite this strong statement on the right to the fruits of one’s labor, Locke had an
inconsistent approach toward slavery. See SEYMOUR DRESCHER, CAPITALISM AND
ANTISLAVERY 23–24 (1987) (noting Locke’s differing positions on slavery).
54
See KANT, supra note 47, at 18.
55
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 138. For Locke, property interests could manifest themselves
in both tangible and intangible objects, and both held critical roles in self-development. See
Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891,
945 (2006) (“[F]or Locke, self-development requires property and this requires not only
tangible assets, but also cultural and social properties. Both tangible and intangible properties
improve the conveniences of life.”) (footnote omitted).
56
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 138.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. § 54.
60
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540
(1988) (“Republican thought played a central role in the framing period, and it offers a
powerful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism.”).
61
Akhil Amar describes the republican tradition as “basically one in which there is a
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that came with the protection of property led to political autonomy: an individual
could participate as an independent actor, not dependent on the whims of others, in
the functioning of democracy, and thus realize the self-determination at the heart of
the democratic experiment.62 Gordon Wood explains that in classical republican
thought, property “had been considered in proprietary terms as part of a person’s
identity and the source of his authority.”63 This civic republican ideal was captured
by Pocock, who found that it emanated from the Western philosophical and political
tradition, with roots in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas.64 According to Pocock,
civic republicans believed “[p]roperty was both an extension and a prerequisite of
personality,” and it was possible “that different modes of property may be seen as
generating or encouraging different modes of personality[].”65 In this view, the
“citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and autonomy was necessary
for him to develop virtue or goodness as an actor within the political, social and
natural realm or order.”66 It was not possessed “in order to engage in trade, exchange
or profit; indeed, these activities were hardly compatible with the activity of
citizenship.”67
Among American founders, nowhere is this connection between property, the
integrity of identity, and autonomy perhaps more apparent than in the thought of
James Madison. In an essay on property published in 1792, he would argue that
property, in one sense, means “that dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”68 He
would also argue, however, that “[i]n its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every

recognition that in order for one truly to be a citizen in a democracy and to participate in its
democratic process, one needs a minimum amount of [economic] independence.” Akhil Reed
Amar, Republicanism and Minimal Entitlements: Of Safety Valves and the Safety Net, 11
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 47, 48 (1988). See also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970
68 (1998) (arguing that, for the Federalists, “[p]roperty strongly symbolized stability and
assured the conditions that were necessary for the exercise of one’s skills in the public
sphere”) (footnote omitted).
62
To quote Amar again on the republican tradition in relation to the value of property,
“a minimal entitlement to property is so important, so constitutive, and so essential for both
individual and collective self-governance that to provide each citizen with that minimal
amount of property, the government may legitimately redistribute property from other
citizens who have far more than their minimal share.” Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a
Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37
(1990).
63
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 269 (1992).
64
J. G. A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 103 (1985).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792).
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one else the like advantage.”69 An individual has property, in both senses of
Madison’s use of the term, in not just “land, or merchandize, or money,” but also in
that individual’s “opinions and the free communication of them.”70 These included
“a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and
practice dictated by them.”71 The individual also possesses “an equal property in the
free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.”72
In these ways, for Madison, just as the individual “is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.” Madison also
believed that tyranny was marked by threats to property in this broader sense of the
term. As he would write, “Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is
duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his
possessions.”73 In one of Madison’s famous Federalist essays, he would blend the
notion of individuals’ faculties and their ability to secure property; further, the object
of government was the protection of such faculties.74
Erik Olson has described the civic republican view of property, its relation to
the self, and the cultivation of civic virtue in a democracy as follows: “given the
right conditions, property might be thought of as part of the ethical and civic
situation of the self; to be sure, not in the sense that the mere acquisition of property
is a moral or civic end in itself, but rather in the sense—the Aristotelian sense—that
it is an instrument which, when used properly, can contribute to the cultivation and
practice of moral and civic virtue.”75 In this tradition, the “patriot,” protected by
property rights and enjoying property interests, had political autonomy, and he or
she was an “individual rendered independent by . . . property and permitted an
autonomous engagement in public affairs.”76 The very function of the property of
the patriot or citizen “was to give him independence and autonomy as well as the
leisure and liberty to engage in public affairs.”77

69

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. Mary Ann Glendon would go even farther, arguing that “the very structure of our
government was developed around the problem of protecting private property.” MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 25 (1991).
73
Madison, supra note 68.
74
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (asserting that government’s “first object”
is to protect the faculties which allow men to acquire property).
75
ERIK J. OLSON, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF DEMOCRACY 119
(2006).
76
Id. at 109.
77
Id. In the colonial era, many argued for voting rights to be connected to and dependent
upon property ownership. One of the justifications for this position was “only those with a
property stake in the nation had the responsibility and permanence necessary for participation
in its councils.” FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1985).
70
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Cass Sunstein argues that civic republicans “have historically believed in the
importance of property rights as a shield against the state and as a guarantor of
security, independence, and virtue.”78 Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon explains that
civic republicans embraced a “vision of freedom that appealed to Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike” in which “[i]n a very concrete way, property could be seen
to promote independence and personal security for the majority of white male
inhabitants.”79
According to Carol Rose, a wide and fairly equal distribution of property in the
early republic was seen as justified because “property lent independence to
individuals and that independence enabled them to exercise the autonomous
judgment necessary for their common self-rule.”80 In turn, the relative economic
equality had certain effects on political equality. The early days of the republic were
marred by a disparity in wealth, and dramatic differences in political and economic
power centered around gender and especially race. 81 Nevertheless, at least with
respect to white men, Tocqueville would note that, among all of his observations
about the new nation in the early 19th century, nothing would strike him “more
forcibly than the general equality of conditions”82 and this equality gave “a certain
direction to public opinion, and a certain tenor to the laws . . . .”83 This equality was
“the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point
at which all my observations constantly terminated.”84
Following the American Revolution, Freidrich Hegel would theorize on the
connection of the self, or what he would describe as the individual’s will, to property.
For Hegel, “[a] person has the right to direct his will upon any object, as his real and
positive end.”85 Through this process, “[t]he object thus becomes his.”86 Because
that object “has no end in itself, it receives its meaning and soul from [the
78

Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1551 (footnote omitted).
GLENDON, supra note 72, at 25. Seen in this light, one’s home was a “sanctuary” and
an individual’s “castle.” Id.
80
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 61 (1994) (footnote omitted). Reich would echo such
sentiments. Reich, supra note 16, at 771 (“[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining
independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority
has to yield to the owner.”).
81
For an analysis of economic inequality in the immediate, post-colonial era, see
generally PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700, 79–85 (2016).
82
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA xxix (Henry Reeve trans., D.
Appleton & Co. 1899) (1835).
83
Id.
84
Id. On the concerns for economic inequality that animated James Madison in drafting
the U.S. Constitution, see, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION 99–104 (2017).
85
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 44, at 6 (S.W.
Dyde trans., Dover Publ’ns 2005) (1820).
86
Id.
79
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individual’s] will.”87 In these ways, the self is only instantiated through the desire to
acquire objects, and by acquiring such objects, one realizes, in the material world,
the very essence of the self, i.e., the individual’s thoughts and desires.88 As Hegel
would explain, “when I as a free will am in possession of something, I get a tangible
existence, and in this way first became an actual will.”89 This was the “true and legal
nature of property, and constitutes its distinctive character.”90 In turn, the recognition
of those objects, which were the reification of the self, was seen by Hegel “as a
medium for the expression of personality and therefore crucial to realizing the
individual dignity we often associate with liberalism.”91
Locke and Hegel would influence the development of modern property law in
the United States,92 especially in the “Property as Personhood” school of property
scholarship most closely associated with Margaret Jane Radin.93 For Radin, the
individual desires ownership over certain objects, what she calls “personal
property,” because they are so closely associated with and even constitutive of the
self: for example, a wedding ring, one’s childhood home, etc. As Radin explains,
“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These
objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”94 Such property
interests are so closely associated with one’s personality and self that they are
entitled to higher-order protections than other types of property because “to achieve
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over
resources in the external environment.”95 For Radin, “[p]ersonal property is
important precisely because its holder could not be the particular person she is
without it.”96
87

Id.
Id. at para. 41, at 4–5.
89
Id. at para. 45, at 7.
90
Id.
91
Guyora Binder, Post-Totalitarian Politics, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1508 (1993)
(footnote omitted). See also Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the
Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1370 (1996) (describing
Hegel’s vision of the self in relation to property).
92
See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 447–49 (2014)
(describing influence of Locke and Hegel on contemporary property theories).
93
Margaret Jane Radin, Property as Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (1982)
(describing Hegel’s philosophy on property and its relationship to selfhood).
94
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 36 (1993). For Radin, “[o]ne
may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an object by the kind
of pain that would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is closely related to
one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.”
Id. at 36–37 (footnote omitted).
95
Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
96
Id. at 45. See also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744 (1986) (arguing that “[p]eople rely on,
consume, or transform resources in many of their self-expressive, developmental,
88
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Despite this rich tradition in Western political thought that ties the integrity of
identity, autonomy, and democracy to notions of property, most legal scholarship
and jurisprudence over the last 130 years has moved away from the recognition of
the self through property protections. Such a departure—where the roots of
democracy are no longer founded on principles derived from property protections
and property protections and their justifications are no longer intertwined with
principles of autonomy and self-determination—threatens the integrity of the
identity. The next section will explore the divergence in legal thought that occurred
at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, which separated protection of the self—
through privacy protections—from property rules.
B. The Emergence of the Right to Privacy
The modern approach to privacy—recognizing it mostly through protections
grounded in tort law—can be traced to a seminal article by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published in the Harvard Law Review 130 years ago entitled simply “The
Right to Privacy.”97 There, the Warren-Brandeis project was both descriptive and
normative. They described the current state of the common law and what they saw
as an emerging scheme of protections that, they argued, preserved what they called
the “right ‘to be let alone.’”98 They also believed the law was moving toward a
recognition of this right; they described common law decisions that seemed to
extend protections beyond those traditionally afforded through property law
concepts: “the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality
not the principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended and
unusual sense.”99 Instead, Warren and Brandeis argued that the “principle which
protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the
emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when
it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestic or otherwise.”100 William Prosser would later describe the Warren
and Brandeis descriptive project as follows:
Piecing together old decisions in which relief had been afforded on the
basis of defamation, or the invasion of some property right, or a breach of
productive, and survival activities. These uses of resources are integral to a person’s liberty,
viewed either as self-realization or as self-determination”).
97
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
98
Id. at 195 (citing COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). For a critique of the
conceptualization of the right to privacy as the right to be let alone, see Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1102 (2002).
99
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 213.
100
Id. In the footnote accompanying this passage, they would defend their claim against
arguments that they were advocating “judicial legislation” because they were merely
applying “an existing principle to new cases.” Id. at 213 n.1.
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confidence or an implied contract, the article concluded that such cases
were in reality based upon a broader principle which was entitled to
separate recognition.101
Warren and Brandeis believed that the law needed to recognize this right to
privacy because the legal regime at the time, in which privacy interests were
protected through property law, was inadequate to the task of protecting privacy. As
Robert Post explains, “Because they desired to construct a right of privacy that
extended protection to an entire inviolate personality and not just to its products,
Warren and Brandeis believed that they were forced to dismantle the property law
structure of common law copyright.”102 Indeed, for Warren and Brandeis, the
existing property-law approach to preserving the right to be left alone was
insufficient to protect the breadth of the interests at stake, i.e., the “peace of mind or
the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all,” which, for Warren
and Brandeis, were “difficult to regard” as property, “in the common acceptation of
that term.”103 Thus, they argued, existing protections, rooted in property law, were
insufficient to keep pace with such technologies and afford protections that most
would find desirous.104
Warren and Brandeis’ normative claim was that such developments in the law
were beneficial and necessary: beneficial, because they helped to ensure basic rights
that they saw as essential to the preservation of the integrity of the individual’s sense
of self, what they called his or her “inviolate personality”;105 necessary, because this
101

William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384, 386–89 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
102
Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 655 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Rereading
Warren and Brandeis]. New technologies often spark the need for the law to catch up to
them. For example, advances in collection and analysis of DNA samples has led to the
argument that such samples should receive property protections in light of these new
technologies. See Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to
Mandate Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 199–201 (2004).
103
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 200–01. As Robert Post explains, “the central
thrust of Warren and Brandeis’s article on ‘the right to privacy’ is to disentangle privacy
from property, and the subsequent influence of the piece rests in great measure upon its
success in that effort.” Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis, supra note 102, at 648. See
also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1916 (2010) (describing Warren & Brandeis as “stress[ing] that privacy
was a mental injury and that property rights were inadequate to address the harm”).
104
Speaking of Warren and Brandeis, Glendon argues that “[p]rivacy was thus, quite
literally, pulled from the hat of property.” GLENDON, supra note 72, at 51.
105
Id. As Robert Post explains, “[s]o conceived [by Warren and Brandeis], privacy does
not refer to an objective physical space of secrecy, solitude, or anonymity, but rather to the
forms of respect that we owe to each other as members of a common community. Personality
is violated when these forms of respect are transgressed.” Post, Rereading Warren and
Brandeis, supra note 102, at 651. On the conception of privacy as the protection of
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notion of the self was under threat given new and emerging technologies.106 They
argued, “Instantaneous photographs and news[]paper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”107 Indeed, it was these technologies themselves
that were threatening to cheapen and coarsen life, both public and private: “modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon . . . privacy, subjected
[individuals] to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.”108
Writing seventy years later, Prosser would argue that “[t]he article had little
immediate effect on the law.”109 But by 1960, when Prosser attempted to summarize
the state of the law regarding the right to privacy at the time, he noted not only that
most states had effectively recognized the right to privacy, either by statute or
decisional law, but also that the tort of invasion of privacy was “not one tort” but
really “a complex of four.”110 These, he would say, consisted of intrusion “upon the
plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs”; public disclosure, the
“disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; publicity, “which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; and appropriation, which
effectively entails the conversion, “for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness.”111 In Prosser’s taxonomy, which would effectively find its way
into the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts,112 we still see the relationship
personhood, see generally Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 300 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984);
Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respects for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1
(J. Ronald Pennock & W. Chapman eds., 1971).
106
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 195.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 196.
109
Prosser, supra note 101, at 384.
110
Id. at 389. See also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 45 (2018) (“By the 1950s, the right of privacy was no
longer controversial and was increasingly accepted across the country.”). According to
Rothman, this right “included the ability to stop (or recover for) the unwanted use or
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness, and was often described as a property right.
It could be asserted by both public and private figures, and allowed recovery for economic
and reputational harms, as well as for emotional distress.” Id.
111
ROTHMAN, supra note 110, at 45. On the right to privacy and the right of publicity
with respect to the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, see, e.g., Jonathan Kahn,
Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation
of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 226–33 (1999); Oliver R. Goodenough, Go
Fish: Evaluating the Restatement’s Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C. L. REV.
709, 716–21 (1996).
112
On the relationship between Prosser’s taxonomy and the Restatement, see Vernon
Valentine Palmer, Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the United States, 26 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 67, 91–92 (2011) (describing adoption of the Prosser privacy taxonomy by
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between property interests and the right to privacy, especially in the last of these
four torts: that of appropriation. Not only does the name evoke images of seizure of
property, but, for Prosser (and the cases he would cite), appropriation consisted of
protecting a “proprietary” interest in “the exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity.”113
Warren and Brandeis were clearly influential—whether in describing existing
law or making a normative claim—in the private law space, as indicated by Prosser’s
argument that by the mid-20th century the right to privacy was well-ensconced in
private law settings.114 They also had a great impact in the public law space, even
though very little of substance in their original article is directed toward government
intrusion on the identified right to privacy.115
The first time a right to privacy was initially recognized by the United States
Supreme Court occurred roughly seventy-five years after Warren and Brandeis first
captured the term in legal scholarship; what is more, unlike in the Warren-Brandeis
conceptualization of it as a private law right, the Supreme Court would embrace it
in several public law contexts. Indeed, the Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,116 a case involving Connecticut’s prohibition on the sale and
distribution of contraception, laid out the justifications for the recognition of the
right. The Court began by rejecting a Lochnerian117 approach to the problem before
it—i.e., it would not use the right to contract as the basis for the right to privacy.118
As the Court found, “We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
the Restatement and the broad acceptance of aspects of that taxonomy in most U.S. states).
113
Prosser, supra note 101, at 406. See also HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH, ANSGAR OHLY, &
AGNÈS LUCAS-SCHLOETTER, PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION 52 (2005) (“Although the right of privacy
was originally conceived as a right of inviolate personality, it quickly began to develop
distinctly ‘propriety’ attributes, which ultimately formed the fourth limb of Prosser’s
dominant reductionist analysis.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 57 (describing Prosser’s “reinterpretation of the law of privacy” as “hugely influential” and “was adopted by the
American Law Institute in the second Restatement”). Prosser would go on to recognize the
ambiguity presented by the classification of this interest, and whether it was properly
considered a property interest or one protected through a tort regime. Prosser, supra note
101, at 406 (“It seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified
as ‘property.’”) (footnote omitted). For a critique of Prosser’s privacy law taxonomy, see
Richards & Solove, supra note 29, at 148–56; Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973 (1964). On the
relationship between privacy rights and property interests, see GLENDON, supra note 72, at
47–61; ROTHMAN, supra note 110, at 48.
114
See Prosser, supra note 101, at 384–89.
115
While several cases cited by Warren and Brandeis make reference to public officials,
few, if any, relate to actions against the government. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 97, at 210 n.1 (citing Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329).
116
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
118
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82.
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need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions.”119 At the same time, the law at issue in Griswold “operate[d] directly
on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect
of that relation.”120
Reading a range of cases touching upon issues of privacy, identity, and
association together,121 the Griswold Court concluded that “the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”122 For
example,
The right of ‘association,’ like the right of belief, is more than the right to
attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other
lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful.123
For the majority, these cases “suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance.”124 These penumbras, emanations, and guarantees create
what the Court called “zones of privacy.”125 It went on to recognize that the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments, as interpreted
119

Id. at 482.
Id.
121
While recognizing that “[t]he association of people is not mentioned in the
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights,” the Court noted that certain other rights had earned
constitutional protection even though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, such as
the “right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice,” or “the right to study any
particular subject or any foreign language.” Id. Moreover, the “right of freedom of speech
and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right
to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach—indeed the freedom of the entire university community.” Id. (citations omitted).
Without what the Court called “peripheral rights,” the specific rights contained in the
constitution “would be less secure.” Id. at 482–83. The Court went on to reference its opinion
in NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where the Court held that if the plaintiff
association’s membership lists were not insulated from disclosure, it would likely constitute
a substantial restraint on the freedom of association. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23 (1978) (describing freedom
of association). While framed as a right to associational privacy, it is possible to view the exante protection afforded associational information in NAACP v. Alabama as a property rule.
122
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
123
Id. (citation omitted).
124
Id. at 484. See also TRIBE, supra note 121, § 11-3 (describing conceptual, historical,
and precedential sources of the Court’s holding in Griswold).
125
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
120
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by the Court in decisions over the years, “bear witness that the right of privacy which
presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”126 While the opinion of the Court
did not reference Warren and Brandeis’ article itself, Justice Goldberg wrote a
concurrence in which he quoted Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. United States,127 which foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Griswold.128
The case law that followed in the nearly 60 years since Griswold was decided
began to chart out the boundaries of the right to privacy, recognizing protections for
a range of intimate relations and choices, from the right to terminate a pregnancy to
the right for individuals of the same sex to marry.129 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in
the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,130 found that state laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage were unconstitutional.131 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, made explicit the connection between identity and the substantive rights
protected in the Constitution.132 In perhaps one of the court’s clearest statements
about the role of the integrity of identity under the U.S. Constitution, Justice
Kennedy opened the opinion with the following statement:

126

Id. at 484–85 (citations omitted). With the jurisprudence of at least one of these
Amendments, the Fourth, there is a long history of interpreting it in relation to property
interests. See Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment
from Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties,
50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 374–76 (2013) (describing the connection between Fourth
Amendment protections and property interests) (footnotes omitted). See also Thomas K.
Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309–27 (1998) (describing relationship between property and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–
26 (2004) (same).
127
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
128
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg., J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
129
See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 724
(1999) (describing the “liberal conception of private choice” as “the idea that government
ought to promote interests in decisional privacy, chiefly by allowing individuals, families,
and other nongovernmental entities to make many, though not all, of the most important
decisions concerning friendship, sex, marriage, reproduction, religion, and political
association”) (footnote omitted).
130
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
131
Id. at 2589.
132
Id. Such an approach is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s prior jurisprudence in
these cases, as Laurence Tribe argues. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name,
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 22 (2015–2016) (“[T]he idea that all individuals are deserving in
equal measure of personal autonomy and freedom to ‘define [their] own concept of
existence’ instead of having their identity and social role defined by the state—has animated
Justice Kennedy’s most memorable decisions about the fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm,
to define and express their identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to
find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their
marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages
between persons of the opposite sex.133
The plaintiffs secured a victory in which the Court declared that “the right to
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”134 The Court further
held that government cannot infringe upon “identity-constitutive” conduct
undertaken by the LGBTQ community.135 Presumably, as in the marriage equality
context, when conduct is so central to one’s individual integrity and identity, a
liberty interest resides in freedom from discrimination that seeks to curtail such
conduct.136 Thus, in the public law context, notions of identity and autonomy are
intertwined and protected, through robust preserves across several normative
dimensions, including at the level of constitutional provisions.
***
This section has shown that because of the deep connections between privacy,
identity, and autonomy, public law treatments of privacy issues have recognized the
right to privacy and the integrity of identity in their own right, at least for many
intimate matters, like the decision to terminate a pregnancy or to marry.
Additionally, in its characterization of welfare benefits as deserving of constitutional
protection as property,137 the Supreme Court, to a certain extent, embraced Reich’s
view, as described above, that the recognition of certain interests through property
protections was essential to autonomy, particularly when government was in control
of such interests. Thus, this array of public law protections, from decisional
autonomy and privacy to property, helped to insulate the integrity of identity from
governmental intrusion.
On the private law side, however, where much of the digital information that is
so central to the integrity of identity currently resides, these interests do not enjoy
such powerful protections. Indeed, the move toward tort remedies for privacy
violations meant that the law would utilize liability rules, instead of property rules,
133

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
Id. at 2604.
135
Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1136–
40 (2017).
136
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50
(2011) (arguing that the seemingly distinct equality and liberty claims are often linked
through protections that are based in promoting and preserving dignity).
137
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
134
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to protect privacy interests.138 According to Calabresi and Melamed, the set of rules
used to protect different interests—what they call entitlements—should be
determined by society’s goals respecting those entitlements, including economic
efficiency, distributional preferences, and “other justice considerations.”139 The
following section discusses their theories in depth, setting the stage for a subsequent
discussion about how their rules taxonomy can and should be applied to protecting
digital privacy and the integrity of identity.
C. Calabresi and Melamed’s Taxonomy and Its Relationship to Privacy
Protections
Calabresi and Melamed analyze three different ways to protect different types
of interests, through what they call property rules, liability rules, and inalienability
rules.140 This taxonomy identifies these approaches to different entitlements and
attempts to match the best rule regime to the appropriate entitlement, not necessarily
based on the common understanding of the nature of the entitlement itself, but on
how society wants to protect it.141
For Calabresi and Melamed, where an entitlement is protected through a
property rule, “to the extent that someone . . . wishes to remove the entitlement from
its holder,” he or she “must buy it from [the holder] in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”142 This arrangement,
they argue, “is the form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state
intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to
decide its value.”143 By contrast, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule when
it may be destroyed by someone “willing to pay an objectively determined value for
it.”144 Finally, the third approach describes what they call inalienable entitlements:
those where their “transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.”145
Rather than basing our judgments about which rules to apply on common-sense
understandings of the entitlement itself, the authors identify broader, societal
interests driving such choices, choices which sometimes vary with the context. For
example, an owner might possess a tract of land. When the owner wants to sell that
land, she will bargain with a potential purchaser until a mutually agreed-upon price
is reached. In this context, a property rule protects the owner’s interest in the land.
138

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93 (describing liability rules). As
stated previously, approaches similar to Calabresi and Melamed’s property rules might also
be used to protect privacy interests in certain situations.
139
Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted).
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1092.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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But when a factory begins to pollute that tract of land by engaging in activities
constituting a nuisance, or the local government wishes to condemn the property and
seize it through eminent domain, the owner might resist these encroachments. While
there may be some bargaining over the damages she might receive for the nuisance
created by the factory, or the local government may attempt to offer what may be
considered just compensation for the seizure of her land, if these different parties are
not able to reach some bargained-for agreement over the amount to pay the owner,
the justice system will become the institutional setting—through a liability rule—to
set the proper compensation to award the owner.146 Thus, depending on the context,
the very same interest—here, the owner’s interest concerning a tract of land—may
be protected by, at times, a property rule, and, at others, a liability rule. In these
contexts, as Calabresi and Melamed argue, “a very common reason, perhaps the
most common one, for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect
an entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that
is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation.”147
It seems clear that the right to privacy, or, to describe it in terms of the
Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy, the privacy entitlement, as currently conceptualized,
is protected at present by liability rules. To the extent the interest is encroached upon,
the invader can compensate the victim at an amount assessed through an adjudicated
dispute.148 As described above, the emergence of the right to privacy was initially a
response to the inadequacy of the property rules then in existence to protect the
interests at stake,149 particularly in light of emerging technologies that made
circumvention of existing protections easier.150 The actual interests at stake seemed
unrelated to the nature of the interests protected by the existing property regime.
146

See id. at 1106–10 (describing liability rule approach to eminent domain disputes).
While society may need to choose between which rules to apply in a particular dispute, it
also must choose the institutional setting in which the dispute is resolved, as Komesar has
demonstrated. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4–27 (1994) (describing different institutions in
which disputes are resolved as the market, the political process, or the courts).
147
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1110.
148
In a recent high-profile privacy dispute involving a professional wrestler, the
dissemination of a sex tape, and an online news source, a jury awarded the plaintiff $140
million in damages for invasion of privacy. Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to
Gawker’s Bill in Hulk Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-milliongawker-case.html [https://perma.cc/B5FF-ZFA4]. The case was ultimately settled for $31
million. Lukas I. Alpert, Gawker Media Settles with Hulk Hogan in Privacy Suit, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gawker-media-settles-with-hulk-hogan-inprivacy-suit-1478107236 [https://perma.cc/YDM6-VS9P]. See also Fraley v. Facebook,
Inc., No. C11-1726, 2013 WL 4516806 (settlement of class action involving social media
company’s alleged breach of user privacy, resulting in monetary damage award to members
of plaintiff class).
149
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 201–04.
150
Id. at 195–96.
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That is, they were not interests that existing property rules seemed to protect, given
the latest technologies and the societal changes those technologies were
advancing.151 As we have just seen, however, it is the context, not necessarily the
nature of the interest, that should determine which rule to apply to protect that
interest. Indeed, according to Calabresi and Melamed, we may protect an interest
through different rules based on the nature of the context in which the interest is
threatened and not on the nature of the interest itself.152 As we have seen, the very
same interest may be subject to a property rule in one context and a liability rule in
another.
In the next two Parts, I will explore, first, the context in which the interest in
the integrity of identity is under threat, particularly given new, digital technologies,
and ask whether the existing liability-rule regime is sufficient to protect the interest
at stake. Following that discussion, I will explore whether the Calabresi-Melamed
taxonomy is adequate to describe chosen approaches to protecting interests in other
contexts. In these settings, I will show that “hybrid rules” are applied, rules that
blend components of liability, property, and even inalienability protections to
preserve critical interests. I will identify the reasons such hybrid rules have been
deployed and determine whether similar rules might lend themselves to application
in the digital world to protect the critical interests at stake in cyberspace.
II. THE INABILITY OF LIABILITY RULES ALONE TO PROTECT IDENTITY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Threats to privacy threaten the integrity of identity. These threats are two-fold:
first, they arise as a result of new technologies;153 second, existing legal institutions
do not seem adequate to the task of protecting privacy, especially in light of such
new technologies. What follows is a discussion of the impotence of the current state
of privacy rules to preserve the integrity of identity in the digital world, the role that
private largess plays in the ability to manipulate identity, and the need for stronger
protections for individual identity in the digital age.
A. The Impotence of Liability Rules in the Digital Age
We have mostly left digital privacy to liability rules. Yet, such rules have been
weakened considerably through what are, in effect, four types of immunities:
contractual immunity, statutory immunity, adjudicative immunity, and enforcement
151

Id.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1096–97.
153
For a description of the ways in which new technologies are making monitoring,
tracking, storing, and accessing personal data easier, see, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY
IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 36–45 (2010);
Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent,
in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189, 189–192 (Omri BenShahar ed., 2007) (describing role of digitization on form contracting).
152
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immunity. Since much scholarship in recent years has addressed these issues, I offer
only a relatively brief review of the current state of digital privacy protections. The
first of these immunities is contractual immunity.154 This immunity arises where
private companies that operate in a digital world—e-commerce companies, social
media companies, or any company with a website—provide a service through
contractual arrangements that create protections for such companies when they
utilize their customers’ digital information. Such immunity is a result of a range of
contractual agreements that authorize companies to use their customers’ data.155
Moreover, as described by Frischmann and Selinger, a form of “engineered
determinism” emerges where acceptance of contract terms is, in effect,
mandatory.156 Research about the opacity of these contracts makes clear that there is
a great deal of asymmetry in consumer knowledge about the terms that they are
accepting.157 While the adoption of new rules for the European Union and the state
of California may curb some of these practices, more disclosure, if it is not accessible
and understandable, will not help to limit contractual immunity.158
The second type of immunity is legislative immunity. In the earliest days of the
internet, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which contains
as its most critical component a provision that immunizes internet platforms from
liability for the content supplied by third parties on their sites.159 A third party can
154

The literature on these and other topics related to these immunities is vast. As a
primer, Omri Ben-Shahar has assembled a wide range of scholars discussing the implications
of form contracting in OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATION OF MARKET
CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
155
Nancy Kim describes this approach as the use of a contract not just as a shield, but
as a sword: not just protecting one party but also stripping the counter-party of rights. NANCY
S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 48–49 (2013).
156
BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 209 (2018).
Indeed, when faced with terms of service agreements, acceptance of such terms is the norm.
Id. at 210 (“Deliberation is wasteful. There’s no room to bargain. Resistance is futile.”).
157
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 7–16 (2013) (describing the asymmetries of information between
consumers and companies). Another aspect of the failure of contractual immunity is the fact
that even where a company with private information might otherwise claim such information
is anonymized, and might even agree through contract to anonymize such information, the
track record of such companies of actually preserving such anonymization in the face of a
data breach is not strong. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1717–22 (2010) (describing
the failure of anonymization technologies to preserve privacy in several data breach
incidents).
158
For an analysis of tort liability under the European Union’s new privacy standards
and the state of California’s new privacy rules, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 371–80 (2019).
159
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). See also, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating
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post privacy-breaching, discriminatory, or libelous content on a platform, like
Twitter or Facebook, and the company that operates that platform is immune from
suit from anyone harmed by the post.160
The third type of immunity is what I call adjudicative immunity. Many relevant
terms of service agreements are subject to clauses that require the resolution of any
disputes under the agreement through arbitration, even disputes involving a wide
range of consumers that might otherwise try to band together and proceed against
the company as a class.161 Such agreements might ban class actions or even class
arbitrations.162 Research strongly suggests that such clauses are highly unfavorable
to consumers because consumers are far less likely to proceed against a company
when they must do so through arbitration; the high cost of individual arbitrations—
as opposed to class actions or even class arbitrations—is also likely to deter
consumers from pursuing claims.163
with a third-party user of the service”).
160
On the emergence and importance of the CDA, see generally JEFF KOSSOFF, THE
TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). On the purposes behind the
CDA, see Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 651–52
(2014).
161
See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right
to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-thirdof-top-websites-restrict-customers-right-to-sue.html
[https://perma.cc/2EY5-4V44]
(describing prevalence of arbitration agreements in online terms-of-service agreements). See
also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–52 (2011) (holding waiver of
class arbitration enforceable); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S.
228, 235–36 (2013) (holding waiver of class arbitration enforceable even where individual
arbitration of dispute impracticable).
162
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344–52; Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers,
125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122 (2011) (raising questions about equality and fairness in
enforcement of arbitration clauses); Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be
Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 218 (2003) (describing
chilling effect arbitration clauses have on concerted litigation activity by plaintiffs).
163
See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution:
An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015) (analyzing nearly
5,000 complaints filed by consumers with the American Arbitration Association and finding
them to be a poor substitute for the traditional class action mechanism). Radin describes at
least four reasons why businesses might insert mandatory arbitration clauses in agreements
with consumers: they prevent aggregation of claims by plaintiffs against the company,
adverse decisions of arbitrators will leave no adverse precedent, decisions are secret, and
businesses may believe arbitrators generally issues decisions that are more favorable to
business interests because they are often selected from the ranks of retired business officials.
RADIN, supra note 157, at 133–34. For an argument that arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts bring benefits to consumers, see Jason Scott Johnson, Cooperative Negotiations in
the Shadow of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, 12,
27–28 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). Recent data submitted to Congress from large
technology firms, which routinely use arbitration clauses in their employment and other
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The fourth type of immunity is enforcement, or prosecutorial, immunity. Few
public actors have taken aggressive approaches toward entities that violate consumer
privacy interests. There is no overarching federal data privacy law. While the
Federal Trade Commission has assumed some responsibility for policing data
privacy, it has, at times, proven unwilling to take aggressive action against
companies in the face of serious privacy breaches.164 While Facebook reached a
settlement with the FTC for its involvement in the Cambridge Analytica scandal,165
some commentators argue that the fine, in comparison to Facebook’s market
capitalization and annual profits, would have little deterrent effect.166 Similar data
breaches have resulted in relatively modest fines for companies responsible for such
breaches, and few believe the FTC and other federal entities are fully engaged in
policing—or have the tools to police data privacy adequately—under existing
laws.167 While state attorneys general have, at times, attempted to police data
privacy, they are in a somewhat weaker position than federal authorities to rein in
abusive data privacy practices.168
contracts, show that only a “trivial number of employees, customers, and contractors” have
filed arbitration claims against several technology companies over the last five years,
including Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple. David Dayen, Tech Companies’ Big
Reveal: Hardly Anyone Files Arbitration Claims, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://prospect.org/power/tech-companies-hardly-anyone-files-arbitration-claims/
[https://perma.cc/QY6T-G56D].
164
But see FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243–49 (3d Cir. 2015)
(upholding FTC authority to prosecute companies for data breaches).
165
See Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?,
GUARDIAN (May 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridgeanalytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie
[https://perma.cc/8SZK-R4DT]
(describing Cambridge Analytica’s use of personality profiling in political communication).
166
See, e.g., Kara Swisher, Put Another Zero on Facebook’s Fine. Then We Can Talk,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/facebookfine.html [https://perma.cc/KQN9-N7FD] (describing the Facebook FTC fine as the
equivalent of a “parking ticket” because of Facebook’s revenue and market valuation).
167
See Josephine Wolff, Filling the Cybersecurity Void, SLATE.COM (Apr. 17, 2019,
12:56 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/04/equifax-data-breach-aftermath-canadaunited-states.html [https://perma.cc/UT7S-HY47] (criticizing FTC for lack of aggressive
enforcement in data breach incidents).
168
That is not to say there is not a role for state governments in protecting consumer
interests in digital privacy. See, e.g., Press Release, Letitia James, Attorney General, New
York, AG James Sues Dunkin’ Donuts for Glazing over Cyberattacks Targeting Thousands
(Sep. 26, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-sues-dunkin-donuts-glazingover-cyberattacks-targeting-thousands [https://perma.cc/BNP4-TMG9]. For a discussion of
the superiority of federal law enforcement efforts to those of state law enforcement in the
environmental context, which has analogies to enforcement of digital privacy, see Robert R.
Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2373, 2388–95 (1996). For an argument that state law enforcement actions can
complement those of federal authorities, see Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in
Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and
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The combination of these four immunities creates an environment where
companies handling digital data privacy are largely free to engage in practices that
intrude upon the most intimate details of the digital self. Moreover, as Radin points
out, these types of immunities create a “degradation of democracy,” because they
often undermine the protections found in legislative acts that are the product of
democratic deliberation and further undermine democratic self-determination.169 As
a result, individuals are at the mercy of these companies when it comes to preserving
the most intimate details contained in the digital world. In other words, they are
subject to private largess: they are individually subject to the virtually unfettered
control of these companies. Making matters worse, they are unable to either identify
these problems collectively or join together, as collectives, to combat them.170 Can
we draw an analogy between this current state of affairs vis-à-vis individuals and
the private sector and what Reich identified as the government largess about which
he wrote in the 1960s? The following section explores this question.
B. Private Largess in the Protection of Identity
Are there parallels between what is happening with digital privacy and what
Reich saw occurring in a different context when he wrote The New Property? There,
Reich saw a growing problem with what he called government largess: the idea that
many in modern society are dependent on the government for the means of ensuring
their economic well-being, or even survival: from professional licenses to welfare
benefits.171 For Reich, the fact that people were so dependent on this notion of
Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 671–74 (1994). For the argument that
differences in resources and strategies of state and federal enforcement authorities lead to
greater and useful enforcement experimentation, see Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement
of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 751–52 (2011).
169
RADIN, supra note 157, at 16.
170
Daniel Solove argues that “enforcement mechanisms that rely upon individual
initiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge and resources to use them.”
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 97 (2004). What is more, since the problems with the weakness of privacy’s institutions
are structural, and not individual, “individual remedies are often powerless.” Id. Solove uses
the concept of privacy “architecture” to describe the current state of privacy affairs and what
he calls the “architecture of vulnerability” which “make people weaker, expose them to a
host of dangers, and take away their power.” Id. at 99. He recommends that we create new
architecture that re-aligns the relationship between individuals, private entities and the state
that “place[s] them on more equal footing,” and “afford[s] people default property rights in
information or other forms of information control.” Id. at 100.
171
Reich would describe the nature and scope of this largess as follows:
One of the most important developments in the United States during the past
decade has been the emergence of government as a major source of wealth.
Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in revenue and power, and pours forth
wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and licenses. Government

2020]

ZONING CYBERSPACE

1247

government largess—and that such largess could be taken away at the whim and
caprice of government officials—made people not just dependent on the state but
also unable to create life plans, order their affairs as they wished, and reach full selfrealization.172 He compared this dependency to feudal relationships between lord
and serf, where authorities could demand fealty and compliance with the behavioral
and political requirements and commitments they imposed. He described the
outlines of this relationship as possessing the following features: wealth and rights
are turned over to government; lines between public and private ownership are
merged; adjudication occurs outside the traditional system of government; the right
to possession is tied to “legal status”; ownership of rights is conditioned on
government largess; such rights may be forfeited back to the government; power is
shared between government and “large private interests;” and the system is
administered to “maintain dependence.”173
The current state of digital privacy exhibits many of these feudal features. We
turn over our digital activities to private entities, “which reallocate[] and
redistribute[] them in the many forms of largess . . . .”174 There is a “merging of
public and private,”175 as private entities are recruited to assist government actors
with surveillance. Through increased reliance on private arbitration to resolve
disputes related to the use of entities acting in the digital space, we operate a system
of justice to resolve such disputes “outside the ordinary structure of
government . . . .”176 Individuals are at the mercy of the private entities holding their
private information, and the terms of possession of digital rights “may be changed
or increased at the will of”177 such private entities. The failure to act with an
has always had this function. But while in early times it was minor, today’s
distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale.
Reich, supra note 16, at 733.
172
As Reich would also argue:
[I]t must be recognized that we are becoming a society based upon relationship
and status—status deriving primarily from source of livelihood. Status is so
closely linked to personality that destruction of one may well destroy the other.
Status must therefore be surrounded with the kind of safeguards once reserved for
personality.
Reich, supra note 16, at 785.
173
Id. at 770.
174
Id.
175
Id. See also VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 121–23 (2017) (describing digital
surveillance of welfare recipients).
176
Reich, supra note 16, at 770.
177
Id. See also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 206–07 (2015) (describing
“circularity” between public and private interests in the digital world).
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unreasonably high degree of diligence regarding the protection of one’s digital
privacy rights generally means the right to control such information is ceded to
private interests. Such private interests act with relative impunity with respect to
such information, and this imposition of a particular type of legal status “is both the
basis for receiving largess and a consequence of receiving it . . . .”178 Finally, to
paraphrase Reich, “the object of the whole system,” with its “attention-merchant”179
approach, is to promote the companies’ interests “in such a way as to create and
maintain dependence” on such entities for the ability to participate in the digital
world.180
But seeing the privatization of public discourse as a sort of “feudalization” of
speech is not exclusive to Reich. Jürgen Habermas would describe the birth and
ultimate demise of the bourgeois public square that emerged in the late 17th century
in similar terms. Although this forum, which arose in coffee houses and salons,
initially helped democracy to take root and flourish in Western Europe, Habermas
identified what he called the “refeudalization” of the public square, when public
debate became commodified through the sale of tracts and newspapers.181 Before
this commodification, the public square was egalitarian and democratic, but, over
time, public debate became subject to the laws of the market: unequal and
undemocratic.182 For Habermas, this process took decades, but, in its early
manifestations, one could find the seeds of democracy.183
I opened this Article with a famous quote from Locke, who claimed that all of
the world was once America: his idea that we once lived in a world with no property
rights that eventually required division of interests and recognition of rights.
Commentators during the early days of the internet saw the world-wide-web as
holding the promise of an egalitarian public square where all could flourish, find
identity, engage with like-minded people, build greater understanding, establish
community, and foster empathy.184 We are presently a far cry from that promise.
178

Reich, supra note 16, at 770.
For a description of the emergence of an economic model through which free content
was delivered in exchange for user “attention,” see TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS:
THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS 16 (2016).
180
Reich, supra note 16, at 770.
181
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 231–32 (Thomas Burger &
Frederick Lawrence trans., M.I.T. Press 1991) (1989).
182
Id. at 179 (arguing that “[c]ompetition between organized private interests invaded
the public sphere,” increasing political inequality).
183
Id. at 141–75. For an application of Habermasian theory on digital technologies, see
generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).
184
For the argument that new technologies make the search for identity and community
easier, see CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 18 (2008). See also MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE
SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15 (2003) (describing the potential of digital tools to restore a
179
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Warren and Brandeis wrote about the need for a right to privacy because they were
concerned with the coarsening of journalism.185 While threats to privacy certainly
undermine the value of the internet and mobile technologies, they also represent a
coarsening of discourse and democracy itself, thwarting individual and collective
self-determination through practices that manipulate the integrity of identity. Reich
would describe the future, as he saw it, as subject to a growing role for the
government and government largess in controlling people’s lives, which he would
describe as the “public interest state.”186 It is a “joyless landscape,” he would argue,
in which there are “no precincts sacred to the spirit of individual man” and from
which there is “no retreat.”187 There, the public and the private are blurred; as a
result, “it will be necessary to draw a new zone of privacy.”188 Moreover, if “private
property can no longer perform its protective functions, it will be necessary to
establish institutions to carry on the work that private property once did but can no
longer do.”189 Or, as Monroe Price argued at the dawn of the internet, when the
internet was seen as holding out the promise of creating a “speech nirvana,”190 “new
rules of protection and new modes of government intervention” might nevertheless
be “necessary to establish the preconditions of democracy.”191
We now face a private interest state, which Shoshana Zuboff calls the era of
“Surveillance Capitalism.”192 Such a state not only threatens the integrity of the self,
but it also threatens democracy itself. For Reich, the dependency on government
largess for the very means of existence, like serfs in a feudal state, meant that those
subject to this largess were unable to lead full lives.193 Moreover, he argued that the
control exhibited by government over the capacity of individuals to live such full
lives struck at the heart of those individuals’ identity itself.194
sense of community). But cf. ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS,
TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 68 (2019)
(decrying what is described as techno-utopianism).
185
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 195–97.
186
Reich, supra note 16, at 778.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Monroe E. Price, Free Expression and Digital Dreams: The Open and Closed
Terrain of Speech, 22 CRITICAL INQUIRY 64, 65 (1995).
191
Id. at 85.
192
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8 (2019) (describing emergence of market
in online user activity and surveillance capitalism as “claim[ing] human experience as free
raw material for translation into behavioral data . . . [that is] fabricated into prediction
products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later . . . [and] these prediction
products are traded in a new kind of marketplace for behavioral predictions”).
193
For a description of current welfare agency practices that carry out many of the same
oppressive functions that Reich identified in the 1960s, through algorithms that the author
calls a “digital poorhouse,” see EUBANKS, supra note 175, at 178–89.
194
Reich, supra note 16, at 733 (arguing that “in a society that chiefly values material
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Reich asserted that the range of interests subject to government largess should
receive treatment as a property and protected by property rules because “property
performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society
by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner.”195 With such
protection, “[w]him, caprice, irrationality and ‘antisocial’ activities are given the
protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry.”196 He
would assert that while constitutional protections found in the Bill of Rights could
serve to protect these interests, “the Bill of Rights comes into play only at
extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis . . . .”197 On the other hand, “property
affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final
analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of private property.”198
Furthermore, Reich argues, “[p]olitical rights presuppose that individuals and
private groups have the will and the means to act independently.”199 But to act
independently and in furtherance of their interests, “their well-being must first be
independent”200 and “[c]ivil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights
will not preserve them.”201 Reich was concerned primarily with public actors having
too much control over a pervasive set of interests falling under the rubric of
government largess. Thus, his public law solution called for granting individuals
greater civil rights and liberties grounded in property in relation to government
largess.202 Given that today’s threats to privacy mostly stem from private largess,
which is controlled by private actors and thus largely outside the
constitutional/public law framework, would a new array of private law protections
better protect the individual from abuse of these interests? The following discussion
explores this question.
C. The Need for Enhanced Protections to Preserve the Integrity of Identity
Calabresi and Melamed argue that we should protect certain interests, in certain
ways, by tailoring and optimizing the processes by which markets for such interests
function as society pursues the goals it has for the distribution and protection of such
interests.203 Such protections might include, in extreme cases, rendering some
well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation
of individuality” and that the growth of largess “affects the underpinnings of individualism
and independence”).
195
Id. at 771.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
See id. at 774–77.
203
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1098–1101. For Calabresi and Melamed,
such goals can be categorized under three “headings”: economic efficiency, distributional

2020]

ZONING CYBERSPACE

1251

particular interests inalienable.204 There is no doubt that there is a market for digital
information. The creation of digital information markets is, in many ways, the
purpose of the generation of much digital information.205 There is a bargain of sorts
struck between the end-user and the entity delivering services to him or her, mostly
free of charge.206 The result of this bargain is that the user provides the entity with
information in exchange for the use of the product or service. In many ways, because
the user gets the service for free, the user is the product, and the information he or
she generates in the digital world is then for sale.207 In turn, the entities receiving
this information internalize the benefits of their sale; the users suffer the externality:
that is, the breach of the integrity of their identity.208 In well-functioning markets,
negative effects and positive benefits generally align, so that those who internalize
the benefits must also internalize much of the harms that their actions generate.209
Any privacy regime should recognize that those benefiting most from the sale and
distribution of private information must both prevent the improper disclosure of that
information and be held accountable when such information is released without the
proper consent of those affected by such release. In other words, the benefits should
align with the burdens.210
Like Reich’s fears about government largess and its impact on individual
autonomy and dignity, the private, personal sphere which exists in the digital world,
the “digital self,” is under threat. This has profound implications for democracy. As
Frank Michelman argues when discussing the virtues of a public law right to privacy
as a political right:
Just as property rights—rights of having and holding material resources—
become, in a republican perspective, a matter of constitutive political
concern as underpinning the independence and authenticity of the citizen’s
preferences, and “other justice considerations.” Id. at 1093.
204
Id. at 1111–15.
205
See, e.g., ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK
CATASTROPHE 190–91 (2019) (describing Facebook’s profit motive as the driving force
behind much of its activities).
206
See ZUBOFF, supra note 192, at 67–69 (describing emergence of market in online
user activity).
207
Id. at 69 (noting that, with online activities, users are “the sources of raw material
supply” that is mined by digital companies for profits).
208
For further discussion of balancing positive internalities and negative externalities,
see, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 17–18 (2003). For a description of the private information stored on the typical cell
phone, see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014).
209
As Harold Demsetz argued, a “primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.” Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967).
210
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63
(1999) (arguing for a system of protecting privacy through which “those who would use . . .
[private] data internalize th[e] cost”).
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contribution to the collective determinations of public life, so is it with the
privacies of personal refuge and intimacy.211
When it comes to our digital privacy, the fact that so much is revealed in the
digital world makes the digital self vulnerable, with our thoughts exposed and our
core beliefs subject to manipulation for political ends, not necessarily of our
choosing.212 Twentieth-century media theorist Marshall McLuhan argued that our
communications technologies have become an “extension of our own bodies and
senses.”213 Echoing this sentiment, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the
Supreme Court in Riley v. California, described cell phones as “such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they
were an important feature of human anatomy.”214 With the advent and use of new
mobile and digital technologies, we are creating a trail in the digital world that is not
just an extension of ourselves; it is us.
Furthermore, the digital self we cultivate is not just an expression of our
identity; that self is also manifest in the associational ties we make with others, those
with whom we identify. While some privacy scholarship has discussed the public
goods that come from privacy,215 little attention has been paid to the collective
goods—the benefits we generate by working in association with others, in both
public and private—for our individual well-being and the health of democracy.216
When we identify with and work collaboratively with others, we develop social
capital,217 which, in turn, can be leveraged to solve collective action problems.218
211

Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1535 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
212
For recent journalistic accounts that have exposed the extent to which social media
algorithms can lead to more extreme behavior, see Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube
Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/tech
nology/youtube-radical.html [https://perma.cc/J5CL-7QGE]. See also Jack Nicas, How
YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s Darkest Corners, WALL ST. J. (updated Feb. 7,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-youtube-drives-viewers-to-the-internets-darkestcorners-1518020478 [https://perma.cc/YY4A-SXN5].
213
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 68
(M.I.T. Press 1994) (1964).
214
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
215
See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1008 (1989) (describing privacy “as an
inherently normative set of social practices that constitute a way of life”); Joshua A.T.
Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 389 (2015).
216
For a discussion of public and collective goods, see supra note 25.
217
For a description of social capital as being present in “networks of civic engagement
[which] foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social
trust,” see Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995).
218
Elinor Ostrom & T.K. Ahn, The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective
Action, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 17, 22 (Gert T. Svendsen & Gunnar L. Svendsen
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Moreover, when social capital is manifest in a network, that network can then start
a movement and bring about social change, representing actions that reflect the
pursuit of both individual and collective self-determination.219 Over the last fifty
years, some of the most dynamic social movements in the U.S. have arisen around
their members’ identities and have brought about significant social change.220 When
the integrity of identity is threatened and the ability to discover the self and others
with whom we identify, it chills not just speech, but action, particularly collective
action. This strains and limits community problem solving, thwarting the positive
outcomes that collective action can generate and stifling positive social change.221
When a group of individuals gets together to address a societal problem, not
only do they face the challenge of addressing the problem itself, they also face the
dilemmas inherent in any collective effort.222 Collective action problems frequently
cause situations in which members of a group or community “find it difficult to
coordinate their actions to secure their group interest.”223 In the classic formulation
of the collective action problem, when individuals work towards some collective
goal, their self-interest may lead them to “free ride” on the hard work of others in
the group pursuing that goal until the collective work of the group collapses.224 As
eds., 2009) (describing connection between social capital and solving collective action
problems).
219
See LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS: WHY SOME SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS SUCCEED AND OTHERS DO NOT 27 (2018) (arguing networks of trust are
essential to bringing about positive social change). See generally Alberto Melucci, The
Process of Collective Identity, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 41 (Hank Johnson &
Bert Klandermans eds., 1995) (describing relationship between collective identity and
individual autonomy).
220
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 103–49 (1978) (describing work of the
African-American Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the early 1970s); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 419, 425 (2001) (describing work of the civil rights, women’s liberation, pro-choice,
gay liberation, and disability rights movements as having a core goal of “forc[ing] society to
recognize the movements’ constituents as equal citizens and persons who were just as worthy
as the social norm—namely, the white heterosexual male”). Going back more than two
centuries for insights, Rubin has argued that it is worthwhile to “envision the Constitution as
part of a larger social process, the product of a mobilized citizenry whose members were
either attempting to achieve particular goals or to define their own identity.” Edward L.
Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 65 (2001).
221
For a discussion of the role of identity in social movements, see, e.g., Steven M.
Buechler, Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory, 34
SOCIO. Q. 217, 228–31 (1993).
222
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (outlining dilemmas inherent in group efforts).
223
KEITH DOWDING, POWER 31 (1996).
224
See OLSON, supra note 222, at 54–55.
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Robert Hockett explains, “the hallmark of a collective action problem is its tending
to aggregate multiple individually rational decisions, absent coordination, into a
collectively irrational outcome—an outcome that is ultimately suboptimal for each
individual agent.”225 Garret Hardin described this phenomenon through the
metaphor of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” where individual, wealth-maximizing
activity will undermine the collective interests of a group.226
How does all of this relate to digital privacy? Dennis Hirsch has called the
problem of privacy in the digital world “the tragedy of the trust commons,” where
abusive conduct on the part of those who come in possession of private information
will lead to less trust in the digital world, discouraging participation in it.227 While I
agree with Hirsch’s description of one aspect of the privacy “tragedy,” which
features the prospect of diminishing financial rewards for those marketing goods and
services over the Internet, I believe the weakness of privacy-protecting institutions
runs deeper and has wider effects. The harms that result from breaches of privacy
do not just limit individual activity in the digital world; they also find their collective
endeavors in the real world threatened, compromised, and even manipulated,
meaning they will not generate the collective goods that come from authentic
collective action.228 Shoshana Zuboff described the critical decision made by
Google’s leadership to begin trying to monetize the information it has on its users’
preferences. 229 It was then that the digital Upside Down emerged, and our activity
in the virtual world became a good to be cultivated, harvested, and marketed. Now,
countless companies track, store, commoditize, and sell information about our
online activities. Storage alone creates a problem because any time information is
maintained, it can be breached.230 Harvesting and sale of such information, even
without a privacy breach, with little regard for the harms that can come to the
individual through such a sale, means that companies internalize all the benefits and
externalize all of the harms that might befall those whose information is
commodified. As we know from Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, when benefits
and externalities are out of balance, and one party can internalize all of the benefits
and externalize all of the harms, society pays.231
225

Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of
Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies and Formally Similar
Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1, 3 (2015).
226
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
227
Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons:
A Response to Professors Fairfield and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67, 70–74 (2016).
228
On the role of identity in collective action, see DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO
DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 105–07 (2d ed. 2006).
229
See ZUBOFF, supra note 192, at 63–81.
230
As more information is digitized, it follows that more information will be vulnerable.
See KEVIN KELLY, THE INEVITABLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 12 TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES
THAT WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE 257–258 (2016) (describing expansion of digitization).
231
Hardin, supra note 226, at 1244–45. For a description of externalities in the context
of incompatible land uses, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30

2020]

ZONING CYBERSPACE

1255

A metaphor from game theory can help illuminate the collective action problem
posed by subjecting the integrity of identity to private largess. One classic gametheoretical modeling of the collective action problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(“PD”). In the PD setting, we are asked to imagine two prisoners being held by the
authorities in separate interview rooms. If both cooperate and remain silent,
divulging no information to the authorities, they can both go free. If one “defects”
from cooperation and turns into an informant, pinning the blame on his or her
confederate, that informant will go free while the other prisoner takes the fall for the
crime.232 The essence of the arrangement is the degree of trust between the prisoners.
If they trust each other and behave cooperatively, they can realize the optimal
outcome: both prisoners go free. If they do not trust each other (or one trusts while
the other breaches that trust), only one prisoner will come out ahead. Finally, if both
defect, they will each find themselves facing more trouble with the authorities.233
The privacy problem I have been highlighting adds a new twist to the PD game.
In the privacy setting reimagined as a PD game, we can, again, think of two
prisoners. Instead of being held incommunicado in two separate rooms, however,
they are cellmates. They communicate with each other about the crime and what
they plan to say to evade prosecution. Research into trust-generating behavior in
both these sorts of games and real-world group settings reveals that certain types of
behaviors increase trust and cooperation: for example, face-to-face interactions,234
explicit agreements to cooperate,235 and even general communication between the
parties.236 Therefore, we can imagine, putting the cellmates together increases trust
and facilitates cooperation that can lead to the optimal outcomes for the prisoners.
Imagine further that the cellmates talk about the crime and reach an agreement
as to what they will say when questioned. They “get their story straight,” and the
two are confident that they will both adhere to that story so they can both go free.
(1972).

232

For a description of experiments using the Prisoner’s Dilemma approach, see
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7–11 (1984).
233
See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 312–13 (1994) (describing Prisoner’s Dilemma game).
234
See generally, e.g., Bert Klandermans, The Social Construction of Protest and
Multiorganizational Fields, in FRONTIERS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 77, 89–90 (Aldon
D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (contrasting the effectiveness of
interpersonal interaction between group insiders with interpersonal interaction involving
outsiders).
235
James L. Loomis, Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative
Behavior, 12 HUM. REL. 305, 314-15 (1959).
236
Donna M. Desforges, Charles G. Lord, Shawna L. Ramsey, Julie A. Mason, Marilyn
D. Van Leeuwen, & Sylvia C. West, Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on Changing
Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 531, 531
(1991). For a meta-analysis of communication in game settings, see generally David Sally,
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from
1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58 (1995).
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The truth is, however, one of the prisoners is an informant and is recording their
conversation. That informant asked leading questions of the cellmate and has gotten
that individual to confess to the crime. The recording of the conversation will be
shared with the authorities and used against the cellmate as evidence of guilt and to
achieve the informant’s release. The privacy-as-collective-action problem is like this
new version of the PD game. In it, one party has information that would be
embarrassing about the other and is willing to share it with others to get ahead, to
internalize the benefits of sharing the information and externalize all of the harm.
There is both an element of trust—the cellmate trusts the informant not to share the
information—and that cellmate is subject to the informant’s largess: the cellmate is
at the whim of the informant. The combination of asymmetry of information (the
knowledge that one of the prisoners is an informant), with the ability of one party to
internalize benefits and externalize harms, leads to a coordination problem, and an
outsized risk of predatory conduct. Thus, in settings where misplaced trust can
expose one to harmful conduct, a collective action problem emerges where an
individual is in a position to maximize their own rational, self-interest at the expense
of others, internalizing all of the benefits and externalizing all of the harms.237
The Digital Upside Down poses similar problems as the newly imagined PD
game described above. There is the direct harm of having our private information
revealed without our informed consent.238 There is also subsequent, second-order
harm from commodification and sale of private information: individuals are likely
to refrain from engaging in exploratory actions concerning the political and social
identity with which they identify and will not find other, like-minded people,
particularly where cultural norms might encourage the suppression of such
identities. Without the ability to conduct a robust search for the self we might wish
to become, we fail to develop into the person we might aspire to be. Moreover, we
fail to find those with whom we might join as allies in the search for collective selfdetermination. In turn, the failure to engage in collective activities means individuals
will not produce and enrich their social capital and not bring about the public goods
that such collective activity and social capital often produce.239 In addition, those
individuals may face manipulation by social media algorithms—based on private
information—that lead us to espouse beliefs and engage in activities inconsistent
237

This is worse than the free-rider problem identified by Olson. Here, the informant is
taking affirmative acts in pursuit of his or her own self-interest, to the detriment of the
confederate, more like the aggressive, rent-seeking cattle rancher in the tragedy of the
commons imagined by Hardin. See Hardin, supra note 226, at 1244.
238
See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047, 2051 (2001)
(describing range of direct harms that result from breaches of privacy).
239
For example, in their study of the functioning of local governments in contemporary
Italy, Robert Putnam and his colleagues found that in regions with a robust and sustained
history of associational activity that generated social capital, civic activity flourished and
local governments functioned better and with greater efficiency than in regions with less
such activity. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ROBERT LEONARDI, & RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 119–62 (1993).
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with those we might embrace in the absence of such manipulation.240 Thus, in
addition to the collective action problem Hirsch identifies as stemming from the
“tragedy of the trust commons,”241 the collective action problem the current privacy
rule regime poses is one in which the rent-seeking activity of some prevents others
from both realizing the self they would most want to achieve and finding others with
whom they can align to bring about any social change they might otherwise
pursue.242 I have already discussed the ways that the liability-rule regime does not
seem up to the task of solving this collective action problem. Could property or even
inalienability rules help solve them? Are there ways different rule regimes might
help address this collective action problem?
Protecting individuals and the integrity of identity in the digital world poses a
significant collective action problem. It is created by several contextual factors that
have emerged to make up the “action arena,” as Ostrom would call it, where our
private information resides.243 First is the asymmetry of information, including the
user’s lack of knowledge about what information is obtained about him or her and
how that information is used and with whom it is shared.244 Second, there is
asymmetry of bargaining power, as engagement with the digital world is becoming
a critical component of contemporary life, whether it is to learn about and keep
abreast of current events, to find like-minded individuals, to participate in the life of
the community, to engage in a job search, or to find a life partner.245 All of these are
240
See Allyson Haynes Stuart, Social Media, Manipulation, and Violence, 15 S.C. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 100, 104–18 (2019) (describing social media manipulation as creating three
“primary problems”: improper influence over elections, the incitement to violence, and the
“tangential effect on violence” from the amplification and validation of extreme views
online). See also Roose, supra note 212 (describing manipulation through social media
algorithms); Nicas, supra note 212 (same). Andrew Tutt traces this manipulation at least in
part to protections afforded speech through the First Amendment and some of the immunities
described above. Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 285–86
(2014) (arguing “our discourse stands to be manipulated and controlled in ways society
cannot reflect upon nor shape” due to immunities afforded to internet providers).
241
Hirsch, supra note 227, at 70–74.
242
Charlie Warzel & Stuart A. Thompson, How Your Phone Betrays Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/21/opinion/locationdata-democracy-protests.html [https://perma.cc/67VS-5GFC] (describing chilling effect on
democratic participation of privacy intrusions like location tracking).
243
For Ostrom, an action arena is “where participants with diverse preferences interact,
exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the
many things that individuals do in action arenas).” See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 14 (2005).
244
See, e.g., Michael Kosinski, David Stillwell, & Thore Grapel, Private Traits and
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5805 (2013) (“[G]iven the ever-increasing amount of digital traces
people leave behind, it becomes difficult for individuals to control which of their [personal]
attributes are being revealed.”).
245
For a discussion of the importance of digital access in the contemporary world, see
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critical to the individual’s formation of the self as well as the strengthening of social
bonds and participation in the life of the civic community.246 Third, there is little
accountability for privacy abuses, creating a moral hazard on the part of those in
possession of private information.247 Because of informational and bargaining power
asymmetry, and a lack of transparency and accountability when breaches occur,
individuals often engage in conduct with little knowledge of its potential
consequences and pursue little recourse when harmed. As we have seen in recent
years, knowledge of individuals’ digital selves can be used to manipulate the
individual.248 In authoritarian societies, it is used to oppress.249 The collective action
challenge of the privacy-as-collective-good problem is that cooperation to protect
privacy is highly unlikely, and loose practices250 are likely to continue, endangering
the public goods that are often a product of privacy’s collective benefits.251
Collective action problems often follow when it is difficult to monitor and compel
the cooperation of the members of a group. Some structural rules are needed to
provide guard rails that encourage cooperative behavior and punish breaches of trust
and predatory conduct.252 The collective-goods problem thus is two problems that
generally COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ISSUE BRIEF: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF BROADBAND ACCESS 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/page/files/20160308_broadband_cea_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q88XHFE] (finding that access to broadband “provides numerous socio-economic benefits to
communities and individuals”).
246
For research showing that connections in the digital world are beneficial for
strengthening so-called weak ties, which are important for economic and social well-being,
see Nicole B. Ellison, Charles Steinfield, & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of Facebook
“Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1153–65 (2007).
247
For a discussion of the dangers of creating moral hazard in the privacy context
through prohibiting the “indiscreet” to consent to dissemination of their personal
information, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The “New” Privacy and the “Old”: Is
Applying the Tort Law of Privacy Like Putting High-Button Shoes on the Internet?, 17
COMM. L. & POL’Y 107, 126 (2012).
248
On the capacity for social media algorithms to manipulate users, see Roose, supra
note 212; Nicas, supra note 212.
249
BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS: THE PROMISE AND
THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE 289–90 (2019) (identifying concerns that authoritarian
regimes can utilize digital resources to monitor their citizenry and spread disinformation).
250
For a description of the practices at Facebook that helped lead to the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK
DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 152–55 (2018).
251
See, e.g., 2 SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 75–76 (2019) (raising concerns of potential
foreign meddling in the 2020 election in the U.S.). Of course, in the midst of a pandemic,
too much privacy can also undermine the collective goods when lowering privacy protections
may be necessary to a certain extent to protect public health.
252
The existence of such collective action problems is presented by Calabresi and
Melamed as the justification for imposing many of the rules described in their taxonomy.
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deepen each other: asymmetry of information and a “tragedy of the commons” in
which, in the absence of rules to prevent abuse, predatory conduct is prevalent.253
Calabresi and Melamed argue that different rules might work in different
contexts to help solve collective action problems and achieve society’s goals for how
it orders itself.254 With this approach to collective action problems in mind, are there
aspects of property, liability, and even inalienability rules from which we might
borrow that could lend themselves to preserving the integrity of identity and the
digital self?255 The next Part explores this question.
III. LESSONS FROM PROPERTY SETTINGS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES
TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF IDENTITY
Calabresi and Melamed’s three-part taxonomy may classify how we protect
certain interests as either subject to a property rule, a liability rule, or a rule against
alienation, depending on the interests at stake, the types of problems posed by trying
to protect those interests, and the goals society has concerning how it wishes those
interests to be protected and distributed.256 The reality is, however, over the last fifty
years, interests we might generally recognize as property are protected by hybrid or
blended rules that borrow from each aspect of Calabresi and Melamed’s taxonomy.
At the same time, the most robust rules of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy—those
that could be classified as inalienability rules—may run counter to the notion of selfdetermination and run the risk of being considered paternalistic.257 And when one is
looking to promote self-determination and maximize the extent to which individuals
can realize their autonomy, rules that prohibit certain activities or transactions, or
make particular interests inalienable, would appear to undermine individual choice,
and, as a result, self-determination. Accordingly, an approach that seeks to provide
information adequate for individuals to make informed choices about their private
information while protecting against asymmetry of bargaining power will need to
balance these goals to preserve autonomy and self-determination and the collective
goods they generate.258 As the following discussion shows, in a range of property
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10.
253
For a discussion of the “tragedy of the commons” phenomenon, see Hardin, supra
note 226, at 1244–45.
254
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–15.
255
See, e.g., JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW
DIGITAL SERFDOM 131 (2017) (arguing that “[p]roperty’s characteristics of clarity,
robustness, and automatic exclusion help cover for privacy rights that are often hazy, fragile,
and permit intrusion by default”).
256
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–15.
257
On the role of paternalism in setting inalienability rules, see id. at 1113–15.
258
There is a natural relationship between property rules and its protection of
information. As Fairfield argues, “[t]raditional property rules, including the oldest and most
venerated, are about packaging and conveying information.” FAIRFIELD, supra note 255, at
157. Similarly, sociologist Erving Goffman spoke of privacy in spatial terms, describing the
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law contexts, institutions have emerged that attempt to balance these goals: in the
landlord-tenant, mortgage, and land use contexts.
Indeed, an array of rules protect various property interests, and they combine
elements of property, liability, and contractual protections259 when doing so. Such
complex legal regimes are often invoked to address collective action problems. In
fact, the emergence of private property itself has been described as a response to a
collective action problem, requiring coordination, trust, and cooperation.260 These
requirements have all been imposed due to asymmetries of information, asymmetry
of bargaining power, and the nature of the interest at stake to address different
collective action problems, as the rules around nuisance and eminent domain in the
property context were designed to address different collective action problems.261 In
none of these contexts can we neatly categorize these rules as being either liability,
property, or inalienability rules. As a result, in the contexts described below, we
protect a range of interests through blended or hybrid rules that do not fall neatly
within the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy. The evolution of the rules surrounding
each of these interests follows.

“[t]erritories of the [s]elf” as “[i]nformation preserve[s]” over which we must assert some
degree of control. Goffman, supra note 37, at 38–40.
259
While the Calabresi-Melamed three-part taxonomy identifies property, liability, and
inalienability rules, the idea of contractual relations, obtained through pre-transfer
negotiations, is embedded in their notions of property rules, implicitly excluded from liability
rules, and explicitly barred in contexts where inalienability rules apply. See Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93.
260
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 37–38 (1994) (imagining the emergence of property law as a
cooperative effort to overcome a collective action problem). See also Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351–58 (1967) (describing
emergence of private property regime as a response to the collective action problem posed
by overuse of communal property); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–102 (1990) (arguing that certain
“design principles” help communities overcome collective action problems that arise in the
exploitation of common pool resources). See generally Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land
Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008) (arguing for the implementation of “land
assembly districts” to address the collective action problem that arises in the fragmentation
of land that might otherwise be subject to eminent domain).
261
KOMESAR, supra note 146, at 14–28 (describing nuisance remedies to overcome
collective action problem created by pollution). See also Nestor M. Davidson, New
Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 389, 437 n. 232 (2013)
(describing the possibility of using eminent domain to overcome the problem of so-called
“underwater” mortgages in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10 (discussing role of eminent domain in addressing
collective action problems); id. at 1115–24 (discussing role of law of nuisance in addressing
collective action problems).

2020]

ZONING CYBERSPACE

1261

A. The Warranty of Habitability
Roughly sixty years ago, the relationship between landlord and tenant in the
rental housing market was one of significant asymmetry of bargaining power,
knowledge, and expertise.262 The need for rental housing in many urban settings
created high demand and an inadequate supply of suitable accommodation.263 The
dominant approach in rental housing for centuries had been “caveat emptor”: buyer
beware. 264 The emergence of the leasehold interest occurred at a time when
tenants—subsistence farmers—were in a better position to repair housing conditions
on their own.265 The expansion of urban populations and the accompanying stress
on urban housing supply put landlords in a strong bargaining position with their
tenants, allowing them to eschew repairs and maintenance, leaving tenants little
choice but to accept substandard housing.266 In addition to having little bargaining
power, tenants also had less information about the quality of housing.267 Forced to
take whatever the landlord offered them in tight housing markets, tenants were
unable to find suitable housing.268 In light of these forces, courts began to utilize
contract principles—since the lease was, in effect, a contract—to recognize an
implied warranty of habitability. The landlord warranted that the housing subject to
the lease was fit for its intended purpose—i.e., human habitation—and could not
lease such property without providing certain essential services.269 In this way, the
warranty of habitability contains elements of all three components of the CalabresiMelamed taxonomy. It affects property, it incorporates liability in the nature of a
tort for breach of the duty, and attempts to make certain types of transactions out of
reach (that is, inalienable)—for example, the execution of a lease for property that
does not satisfy the warranty of habitability. Thus, in residential leases, courts and
legislatures have blended these rules to protect lessees. Therefore, even in a setting
262

On the emergence of the warranty of habitability in residential leases, see generally
Jeffrey Hiles, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream Deferred, 48 UMKC L. REV.
237 (1980). See also Francis S. L’Abbate, Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 291–92 (1982); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing warranty of habitability in residential
leases).
263
See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 473–75 (Haw. 1969) (describing
emergence of the warranty of habitability as a response to the needs of urban settings).
264
Jean C. Love, Landlord’s Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee,
Negligence, or Strict Liability, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19, 99 (1975).
265
See Hiles, supra note 262, at 240.
266
Id.
267
For the argument that tenants still face considerable asymmetries of information,
mostly about their remedies and channels for enforcing it, see David A. Super, The Rise and
Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CAL. L. REV. 389, 424 (2011).
268
For a discussion of the purposes behind the recognition of the warranty of
habitability, with a particular emphasis on the unequal bargaining power between tenants
and landlords, see, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171–76 (1974).
269
Hiles, supra note 262, at 241.
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in which a property interest was at stake, due to the asymmetries of information and
bargaining power, and the context in which suitable housing is an essential element
of human existence, we recognize a blended rule, which, today, encompasses
virtually all residential real estate leaseholds.270
B. The Market for Mortgages
While the emergence of an implied warranty of habitability was exclusively a
state law phenomenon,271 in the mortgage market, the U.S. Congress took dramatic
steps to address similar trends and forces that affected the execution of residential
mortgages.272 In the mortgage market, as Americans began to purchase homes after
WWII, many social and economic forces emerged that paralleled the development
of the warranty of habitability. Prospective homeowners faced dramatic asymmetry
of information around the terms of complex mortgage agreements.273 Additionally,
borrowers were unaware of the real estate practices of lenders in terms of potentially
discriminatory behavior. A single homeowner might be discriminated against and
denied mortgage credit, but he or she might not know whether others similarly
situated and members of a protected class were also facing discrimination.274 From
the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, Congress enacted a series of laws designed to
balance some of these asymmetries of information. To this end, the Truth in Lending
Act,275 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,276 and the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act277 were all passed between 1968 and 1975 to provide prospective
homeowners and mortgage borrowers with information about the mortgage
transaction and mortgage lender practices. The context in which these statutes arose,
and which prompted Congress to act, was that borrowers faced a dramatic
asymmetry of information related to individual mortgage transactions and mortgage
270

See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (1980) (extending warranty of
habitability to residential premises).
271
See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, & DALE A. WHITMAN,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.38–6.40 (2nd ed. 1993) (describing emergence of warranty of
habitability protections through state common law and interpretation of state housing codes).
272
For an overview of the concerns that animated Congress to regulate the mortgage
market, see S. REP. NO. 73-972 (1972).
273
U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urb. Dev’t, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce
Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 FED. REG. 68203, 68238 (2008) (noting purpose of RESPA
was to balance out information asymmetries in the mortgage market).
274
For an overview of the emergence of and purposes behind the mortgage practice
disclosure requirements imposed on financial institutions by federal law, see Joseph M.
Kolari & Jonathan D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Its History, Evolution,
and Limitations, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 189, 193–95 (2005).
275
15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.
276
12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
277
12 U.S.C. § 2801, et seq.
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lending practices as a whole.278 They were lured into unfavorable loans, with inflated
closing costs and associated fees, and with little information about the terms of such
loans or the additional payments that they would have to make to mortgage
originators and brokers alike.279 Without sufficient information about the loans into
which they were entering, prospective borrowers were unable to comparison shop
among mortgage lenders to pursue loans on the best terms.280 They were also unable
to determine whether a particular mortgage lender might have questionable practices
when it came to lending to different demographic groups.281
To address these issues, Congress passed this array of statutes attempting to
ameliorate some of these inequities and asymmetries. Under TILA and RESPA,
prospective borrowers receive information related to the critical terms of the
transaction in a simple, easy-to-understand format. Information related to the interest
rate and closing costs associated with the transaction is communicated through a
simple form.282 Today, through this form, lenders are required to disclose a range of
information to consumers in clear, concise terms.283 For example, a sample form
offered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which now has authority to
enforce TILA and RESPA, requires lenders to set forth, in clear terms, the loan
amount, the interest rate, the monthly principal and interest rate, and whether there
is a pre-payment penalty, among other information.284 Through HMDA, mortgage
lenders must report annually on their lending practices, particularly as they relate to
278
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2601(a) (noting Congressional understanding in passing
RESPA that “significant reforms in the real estate settlement process” were “needed to
ensure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided with greater and more timely
information on the nature and costs of the settlement process . . .”).
279
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2603(a) (noting need for “the borrower or lessee in
understanding the transaction by utilizing readily understandable language to simplify the
technical nature of the disclosures”).
280
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2603(c) (requiring clear disclosure of appraisal fees and any
related administration fees charged in relation to mortgage transactions).
281
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its
Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 629–30 (2005) (describing public value of HMDA
disclosures).
282
Formerly called the HUD-1, this document is now entitled the TILA/RESPA
Integrated Disclosure Form or TRID. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
WHAT THE NEW SIMPLIFIED MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES MEAN FOR CONSUMERS (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_tila-respa_what-it-means-for-consumers.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EYJ4-E5UU].
283
See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, TILA-RESPA INTEGRATED
DISCLOSURE: GUIDE TO THE LOAN ESTIMATE AND CLOSING DISCLOSURE FORMS 6 (updated
September 2015) (describing disclosure requirements), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201503_cfpb_tila-respa-integrated-disclosure-guide-to-the-loan-estimate-and-closing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YMW9-F4NE].
284
See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ANNOTATED FORMS FOR TILARESPA INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE 2, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_tilarespa_loan-estimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE8L-9B6B] (last visited June 17, 2020).
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aggregate demographic data on prospective borrowers and the mortgage origination
and mortgage denials related to such borrowers.285 While there is no private cause
of action under HMDA,286 mortgage lenders are subject to suits brought under the
Fair Housing Act,287 based on data revealed through HMDA disclosures.288 And both
TILA and RESPA offer prospective borrowers an array of remedies, including fines,
damages, and rescission of the underlying loan, for violations of those laws and their
associated regulations.289 By combining an information-forcing regime with some
effective remedies for violations, Congress not only “federalized” mortgage lending
in new ways, but it also imposed new rules that blended liability, property, and
inalienability rules, beyond traditional property rules as described by Calabresi and
Melamed. While the notion of caveat emptor traditionally dominated property rule
regimes and pre-sale negotiations were designed to allow buyers to identify and
contract around any perceived risks to their interests, by requiring parties to disclose
more information, prohibiting some types of transactions and practices, and creating
liability protections for certain types of conduct, the new regime that surrounds
mortgage transactions thus involves a blended set of rules from within the CalabresiMelamed taxonomy.
C. Zoning
As with the emergence of the right to privacy as a response to the inadequacy
of property protections in existence in the late 19th century, zoning was instituted
out of a recognition of the inadequacy of nuisance law to deal with the problems
associated with urban and suburban life. As Rachel Godsil explains, “[b]y the early
twentieth century, it became clear that nuisance law alone was insufficient to resolve
285

For an overview of the history and scope of HMDA, see generally Richard D.
Marsico, Looking Back and Looking Ahead as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Turns
Thirty-Five: The Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in a Time of Financial Crisis,
29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205 (2009). While HMDA was designed to provide simple
information about mortgage lender borrowing practices, actually extracting information from
HMDA can be a challenge, and applying it to assist individual borrowers seeking to set forth
mortgage discrimination claims in court is difficult. On the challenges of using HMDA data
in individual discrimination cases, see Andrew Lichtenstein, United We Stand, Disparate We
Fall: Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1360-67 (2010).
286
Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Heart and Phase Transitions: An Exploratory Study
of Congress and Minority Interests, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1729, 1766–67 (1997)
(citations omitted) (noting that there is no private right of action under HMDA).
287
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
288
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair
Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 191–95 (2009) (describing use of HMDA data in fair lending
litigation).
289
For a description of the civil remedies available to a debtor under TILA, see Handy
v. Anchor Mortg. Corp, 464 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
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the tensions between a rapidly industrializing economy and the individual’s property
rights and enjoyment of property.”290 Zoning rules and restrictive covenants
typically encompass an array of rules designed to channel property uses in ways that
solve the collective action problem that can often arise if individual property owners
engage in activities that might diminish or impede the property interests of others in
a community.291 Whether prohibiting certain uses in particular areas or providing a
cause of action for public officials or private actors to sue for damages and injunctive
relief when property owners violate zoning guidelines, zoning rules utilize a blend
of different strategies. They do not rely solely on liability, property, or inalienability
rules.292 They would appear to combine a suite of approaches and remedies that span
the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy, offering a combination of liability, property, and
inalienability rules. Accordingly, zoning, too, might be classified as embracing a
hybrid approach to solving the broader collective action problem that sorting
property uses is designed to address.

290

Rachel Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L. J. 1807, 1858 (2004) (citation
omitted). See also ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 9 (1977) (describing emergence of
zoning regulations as a response to the inadequacy of nuisance law to address ills zoning
attempted to address); Stephen Clowney, A Walk Along Willard: A Revised Look at Land
Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven, 115 YALE L.J. 116, 130–136 (2005)
(describing emergence of zoning in the City of New Haven, Conn., as partly a response to
the inadequacy of nuisance remedies to address land use challenges facing the city). As
Alfred Bettman, who would submit an amicus brief in the landmark case Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), would write in the Harvard Law Review in 1924:
“[T]he need for zoning arises from the utter inadequacy of the law of nuisances to cope with
the problems of municipal growth.” Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 834, 841 (1923–1924). See also Lora A. Lucero, Amicus Curiae: The American
Planning Association in the Courtroom, 26 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2003)
(describing Bettman’s participation in Village of Euclid).
291
See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1081–89
(1996) (describing the history and focus of zoning laws in the U.S.); ROBERT H. NELSON,
PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 154–55
(2005) (analyzing zoning rules through the lens of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy).
292
See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW ch. 5 (4th ed. 1997) (describing
many of the common elements of modern approaches to zoning ordinances). As with
covenants described below, one cannot discount the extent to which zoning can be used, both
unintentionally and intentionally, and has been used, historically, to exclude individuals and
families based on their identities as being of a particular race and/or class. See, e.g., DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON, & DAVID N.
KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 121 (2013) (describing references to disputes
over zoning in New Jersey’s Mount Laurel community as a “shorthand” for disputes over
the exclusionary effects of zoning based on race and class).
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D. Restrictive Covenants
Similarly, when homeowners and other property owners come together
collectively to impose restrictions on the collective use of their properties through
covenants, they are imposing a range of rules from across the Calabresi-Melamed
taxonomy to curtail and prohibit the use of those properties in certain ways to solve
collective action problems.293 The creation of such covenants helps to address such
collective action problems through legal commitments made by original owners and
imposed on those who join the group of owners bound by these restrictions in the
future.294 They can have economic benefits but also inhibit some economic activity
by restricting certain undesirable uses, even if they might also produce an economic
benefit for some. They also embody “small-d” democratic values and help build trust
and social capital.295 As in the mortgage context, where layers of protections drawn
from liability and inalienability rules have supplemented existing property rules,
zoning rules draw from the full array of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy.296
Indeed, by using a blend of liability, property, and inalienability rules, restrictive
covenants can help solve the collective action problems that can arise when
individuals living together in private property settings agree to restrain their use of
the properties affected by the arrangement and often agree to bind future owners of
such properties as well.297
***
As the previous discussion shows, the rules that have emerged in the landlordtenant, mortgage market, and land use contexts bridge the property-liability293

Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
451, 486 (2017) (explaining how restrictive covenants can be used by homeowners to solve
collective action problems).
294
See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 51–55 (1994) (describing legal remedies for
breaches of restrictive covenants).
295
NELSON, supra note 291, at 116–29 (describing values that residential-use
covenants, neighborhood associations, and other similar legal arrangements can generate).
296
Once again, in addition to traditional property-rule protections in the zoning context,
violations of zoning rules can lead to liability, and certain practices are often prohibited
(rendered, in effect, inalienable). Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93.
297
Restrictive covenants are not the only land trust models for promoting social capital.
For a discussion of the role of Community Land Trusts as a land-use approach that can
generate cooperation and help solve collective action problems, see James J. Kelly, Jr., Land
Trusts that Conserve Community, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 70–74 (2009). As with zoning,
one cannot discount the ways in which restrictive covenants have been used to exclude
individuals from property based on their identities. See generally Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding discriminatory covenants unconstitutional); Mark Tushnet, Shelley
v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988) (discussing the
Court’s holding in Shelley).
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alienability rule divide. I consider them hybrid rules that combine elements of each
type of rule within the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy. They are imposed to address
asymmetries of information and bargaining power over critical aspects of modern
economic life and address collective action problems. Can they offer some guidance
on potential legal interventions in the digital privacy sphere? It is to this question
that I now turn in the next Part.
IV. HYBRID LIABILITY-PROPERTY RULES FOR THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE
This final part is the most tentative and exploratory. I have argued that existing
liability rules are proving inadequate to the task of protecting the privacy of
individuals who access the vast digital world. This has implications for personal
dignity, but it also has profound effects on democracy, as the core of democracy is
the maintenance of an autonomous self that can engage in the process of selfdiscovery and self-realization that then manifests itself in political action, and, in
turn, political self-determination.298 For the last century or so, we have mostly
protected privacy interests through what Calabresi and Melamed have called liability
rules. But are there reasons to look to property regimes and a type of blended, hybridrule approach to preserving digital privacy? For Calabresi and Melamed, it does not
matter much whether one calls an interest a property interest or not in terms of
determining whether that interest should be protected by a property or liability rule;
what matters are the goals that society has for the enjoyment and use of that
interest.299 With respect to certain interests that most would consider “property,” like
a home, Calabresi and Melamed show that we use liability rules to protect that
interest in certain contexts: for example, where government wants to seize property
through eminent domain or an entity or individual is encroaching on that property
through actions that constitute a nuisance.300 In such situations, we impose liability
as opposed to property rules because that would appear the most efficient approach
to resolving disputes over the interest.301
There are other contexts in which we impose what are, in essence, liability rules
to protect what otherwise appear to be property interests. In the landlord-tenant
context, we have imposed implied warranties.302 In the residential mortgage context,
Congress has authorized robust disclosure rules that override traditional property
rule relationships, imposing requirements that mortgage lenders provide clear
information related to critical aspects of the transaction.303 One of the core
components of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy when it comes to property rules is
298

Post, supra note 24, at 439–42 (describing the relationship between individual and
community identity, popular sovereignty, and democracy).
299
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10.
300
Id. at 1124–27.
301
Id.
302
See supra Part III.A.
303
See supra Part III.B.
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that such rules generally operate to require buyers and sellers to come to an agreedupon price before the transfer of a property interest.304 In the mortgage context, we
have imposed additional disclosure requirements to ensure borrowers have
information critical to their decision-making process.305
Many commentators have argued that digital privacy should be protected as
property,306 or that those managing digital privacy data should have a fiduciary
responsibility to protect it.307 The ramifications of such proposals have led others to
promote the position that consumers should be paid for their online activity as if it
were a commodity.308 I wish to take a different approach and borrow from several
304

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092.
See supra Part III.
306
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999)
(arguing for a market-based, digital “architecture” that would create a “kind of property right
in privacy”). See also Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the
Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1135 n.444 (1998) (describing some of the benefits
of an approach to regulation of content on the internet that could be analogized to zoning of
physical space). Speaking in the early days of the internet, David Johnson and David Post
argued that treating cyberspace as a separate place would have ramifications for a range of
areas of law but also “should come naturally.” David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996). See
generally Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003) (describing the
relationship between privacy interests and property rights in the context of bankruptcy). On
some of the risks of creating a property right in privacy, see, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 79–84 (1996) (arguing commodification of private information
could lead to alteration of sense of self); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2000) (arguing that
“recognizing property rights in personally-identified data risks enabl[es] more, not less, trade
and produc[es] less, not more, privacy”); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (2000) (arguing recognition of a property right in
privacy interests is not likely to discourage invasions of privacy). Cf., Patricia Mell, Seeking
Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1, 8 (1996) (explaining that “there is no consensus as to whether
privacy is a property right or a personal one”) (footnote omitted).
307
See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 170, at 103–04 (arguing that companies that collect
personal information should serve as fiduciaries of that information).
308
Chloe Aiello, Tech Pioneer Jaron Lanier Says Companies Should Pay for Data:
‘Let’s Get Out of the Manipulation Business,’ CNBC (June 21, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/21/tech-pioneer-jaron-lanier-says-companies-should-payfor-data.html [https://perma.cc/NR6A-PR4H]. For the argument on economic terms that the
threat of disclosure of private information might increase transaction costs and discourage
economic exchange, see Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381, 2397–2402 (1996). See also DAVID BRIN,
THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM? 91 (1998) (recognizing that recognition of a property right in digital
information “would almost certainly produce a citizenry that spends half the next century in
305
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property contexts to argue for a more robust and clear disclosure regime in which
the hybrid rules operative in those contexts might suggest ways to help those with
an online presence to appreciate fully the consequences of their online activity
through a series of simple and mandatory disclosures that would be required of any
entity seeking to utilize individual data.309 Moreover, the sites where online activity
takes place would be “zoned”; they would have to self-identity and self-classify
based on the extent to which they do or do not preserve and protect the privacy and
integrity of the identity of those who visit their sites or use their digital services.
Such a system would not impose the equivalent of inalienability rules and ban access
but would identify sites based on their porousness and permeability.
In the early days of the internet, Lawrence Lessig argued in favor of “zoned”
cyberspace, suggesting that strict inalienability could be a goal of such a system:
“[t]he architecture of cyberspace will in principle allow for perfect zoning—a way
perfectly to exclude those who would cross boundaries.”310 He further articulated
this notion in his work with Paul Resnick, where they describe mandated access
controls that would embrace the notion of inalienability in certain internet
exchanges. However, they noted at the time that such controls posed significant
governance problems, technological barriers, and informational asymmetries.311
courtrooms, filing indignant injunctions to keep other people from sharing this or that snippet
of knowledge without permission—in other words, a permanent entitlement program for
lawyers”).
309
For an argument that clearer, simpler disclosures, particularly with respect to what
the authors describe as unexpected and unfavorable terms would be more effective than is
common in most disclosure regimes, see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading
Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 579–95 (2014). Others argue
that message format and simplicity can impact consumer understanding. See John Kozup,
Charles R. Taylor, Michael L. Capella, & Jeremy Kees, Sound Disclosures: Assessing When
a Disclosure Is Worthwhile, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 313, 315–317 (2012); Vanessa
G. Perry & Pamela M. Blumenthal, Understanding the Fine Print: The Need for Effective
Testing of Mandatory Mortgage Loan Disclosures, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 305, 307
(2012). For the argument that mandated disclosure is generally ineffective in many consumer
settings, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–671 (2011). After analyzing the failures of mandated disclosure,
Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue that simple, easy-to-understand disclosure, coupled with
expert advice, can sometimes overcome the problems associated when consumers are
expected to understand and synthesize a great deal of complex information when making
decisions. Id. at 743–47.
310
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1996).
See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 886–95 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (exploring the possibility of zoning cyberspace).
311
See generally Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A
Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1999). See also Maureen O’Rourke,
Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 703
(1997) (recognizing early in the Internet’s existence that it might emerge into “open” and
“closed” spaces where the open spaces contained less valuable information). Henry Perritt
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Because technology has changed dramatically since the dawn of the internet age,312
and the threats to the integrity of identity have only become more relevant and real,
the time is right to explore whether a form of digital zoning might serve the ends of
protecting the integrity of identity, self-determination, and democracy.
While there is a value to a dialogue about what those precise disclosures and
categories of protections should be, and I would welcome such a dialogue, allow me
to sketch out some of the basic components of such disclosures and categories at this
time.313 First and foremost, browsing itself must be fully protected, and information
about browser activities must be subject to “inalienability-level” security. Perhaps
when shopping for personal items, to the extent we might like a company like
Amazon or Google to market products to us based on our search activities, we could
permit access to and use of such information by those companies. But even that
information has proven deeply embarrassing and violative, as when a company starts
marketing products for infants to an individual whose family may not know that she
is pregnant.314 An individual must be able to rest assured that his or her browser and
search activities are not open to search by others and are not for sale: in other words,
in this context, we could subject them mostly to inalienability rules.315

would predict the digital world much as it exists today, where advances in technology have
permitted the melding of open and closed systems. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and
Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 324 (1996).
312
One of Lessig’s early concerns about zoning in cyberspace to protect privacy was
that technology at the time had not developed that would enable us to know whether we were
being surveilled in the digital world. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 510 (1999).
313
I would also welcome consumer-focused testing that would help ensure the
disclosures were having the intended effect. For an argument that regulatory frameworks in
consumer settings should incorporate consumer testing to ensure that consumers understand
the nature of the transaction and disclosures that are a part of it, what the author calls
performance-based consumer law, see Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law,
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1330–45 (2015).
314
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before
Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012) (describing company use of shopping behavior to
market to customer).
315
Of course, there is also the risk that users will have a false sense of security when
utilizing services with such purportedly high levels of security, and that sense, alone, might
be enough to convince them to share what they might not otherwise share, putting them, once
again, at risk if that information is not truly secure. For a discussion of such risks, see
PASQUALE, supra note 177, at 54. Recent reports have revealed that a texting app, TikTok,
was actually a surveillance tool through which the security officials at the United Arab
Emirates could “try to track every conversation, movement, relationship, appointment, sound
and image of those who install it on their phones.” Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth & Ronen
Bergman, It Seemed like a Popular Chat App. It’s Secretly a Spy Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politics/totok-app-uae.html [https://perma.
cc/BGX5-MPH6].
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Second, entities that have access to individual users’ digital information should
disclose how they will use such information: i.e., whether it is only for their own
purposes and to what ends. Providers will have to disclose simply and clearly
whether they share their customers’ information with third parties, even if such third
parties are cloud services providers.
Third, providers should have to reveal what type of information they record
about their users. If it is a company that provides web-browsing services, that
company should disclose whether it sells individuals’ web-browsing history to third
parties. Similarly, does the provider monitor activity on the company’s site and, if
so, what type of activity? Does the company utilize location tracking and, if so, when
(i.e., only when the application is in use, or otherwise)?
Fourth, to strengthen enforcement, providers should disclose the extent to
which they require the resolution of disputes with end-users through arbitration,
whether they offer liquidated damages to those whose privacy is breached, and
whether they have insurance for the damages that might arise from such breaches.
Such disclosures will not just strengthen enforcement, but they manifest what might
be considered a “trusting first move”: an effort that both signals that an entity is
trustworthy and encourages others to engage in reciprocal trusting actions.316 These
disclosures (with the others described here), then, can help overcome the concern
that mistrust will eventually curtail digital commerce because consumers no longer
trust the sites and platforms with which they share their personal information, the
“tragedy-of-the-trust-commons” phenomenon raised by Hirsch.317
These simple items could form the backbone of a mandatory-disclosure-withzoning regime.318 One could also imagine the “zoning” to include a “hierarchy of
uses,” much like what is utilized in many zoning regimes in physical space319 that
316

Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 531–32 (1995)
(describing advantages of the “trusting first move”). See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 19–20 (1984) (describing optimal strategy in prisoner
dilemma games as “TIT FOR TAT” strategy where players reward cooperative first moves,
creating positive outcomes over time); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust,
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2003) (describing the critical role
of trusting, reciprocal relationships in cooperative endeavors).
317
Hirsch, supra note 227, at 71–74.
318
Such an approach could borrow from the principles set forth in the U.S.
government’s so-called Fair Information Practices (FIPS) regime. For an overview of the
array of federal privacy laws, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA
PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION, §§ 5-1–5-5 (1996). See also
Amanda C. Border, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive Data Privacy
Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363, 364–367 (2012). For
background on and emergence of FIPS, see generally ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY, BOBGELLMAN.COM, https://bobgellman.com/
rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf (last modified Oct. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3LV4-VW3T].
319
See Eric D. Kelly, Zoning, in THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING
235, 253 (Frank S. So & Judith Getzels eds., 2nd ed. 1988) (describing hierarchy or
“pyramid” of uses in the zoning of land).
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might look something like what is set forth below. An entity could ascribe to the
bundle of protections set forth in a particular “zone” and could label its site or digital
function according to the bundle it has accepted. Accepting that bundle would mean
the entity would be liable to the individual for any damages that ensue to her should
the protections that are owed that individual fail to be afforded her.320
Zone 1: Full Protection: The site does not store, track, identify, or sell any
information about the individual’s access to and use of the site. The entity
does not require arbitration through disputes and offers liquidated damages
to those whose privacy it breaches.
Zone 2: Strong Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own
purposes and does not share any information with third parties. The site
does not require arbitration of disputes and offers liquidated damages in
limited circumstances.
Zone 3: Moderate Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own
purposes and shares information with third parties (like cloud storage
companies) that have themselves agreed not to share such information with
other parties. The site may mandate arbitration but does not prevent class
arbitration. It does not offer liquidated damages but maintains insurance in
the event of privacy breaches.
Zone 4: Weak Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own
purposes and shares information with third parties but commits to
anonymizing such information before sale. The site requires arbitration,
forces users to waive class arbitration, offers no liquidated damages, and
does not state whether it maintains insurance.
Zone 5: No Protection: all activity on the site is tracked by the site and third parties
and not anonymized in any way; it is readily available for sale to third
parties. The site does not have to disclose whether there are any
enforcement protections.

320

In recent litigation over digital privacy, the Third Circuit determined that “a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that” a defendant’s promise not to “collect ‘ANY
personal information’ from children itself created an expectation of privacy with respect to
browsing activity on” defendant’s site, warranting application of the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion to this breach. In re: Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293–95
(3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original), cert. denied sub nom. C.A.F. v. Viacom Inc., 137 S. Ct.
624 (2017).
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Of course, companies should not be able to bury disclosures about the zone
through which its services are offered, as they do at present, in opaque and dense
terms of service agreements. Instead, as in the mortgage context, disclosures should
be simple, straightforward, and clear, in a format that is accessible and
understandable.321 More importantly, sites should clearly identify the zone in which
their services are offered.
Indeed, one could imagine a system for websites like the simple star rating used
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rate the safety
of automobiles and trucks322 or that used in several U.S. localities to grade
restaurants for their compliance with health and safety requirements.323 Currently,
when users search on Google, they are alerted that certain search results are
advertisements by a simple, discrete, two-letter tag on such results: “Ad.”324 This
helps users understand that certain search results were purchased by an entity
seeking to promote that product or item, and perhaps that leads users to trust that
search result less than they would if it appeared simply through Google’s algorithms.
In the end, users engaged with locations in the digital world would immediately
know whether they are entering a site that is highly protective of identity or not, and
they could shape such online activity accordingly. Sites that are more closely
associated with political activities and associational life could ensure that they offer
those who visit them the highest and most robust protections.325
321
Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1369–
70 (2011) (noting importance of simple, clear disclosures). For some skepticism on the value
of simplicity in disclosures, see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 121–37 (2018).
322
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration
and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167,
258–60 (2017) (describing the NHTSA vehicle-rating system).
323
For a description and critical review of the effectiveness of restaurant letter-grading
regimes, see generally Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012). One could also envision notice that is more
“visceral,” as Calo describes it, because it “chang[es] the consumers [sic] understanding by
leveraging the very experience of a product or service.” Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2012) (citation
omitted). As Woodrow Hartzog argues, warnings are “useful in making people generally
skeptical” and if “the goal isn’t to transmit information but rather to discourage behavior or
simply facilitate a mind-set, the full panoply of notice techniques is available to regulators.”
Such warnings can include “notice through design in the form of symbols, interface
aesthetics, feedback mechanisms, sound, haptics, and any other notice that might not convey
substance but will affect you on a deep, intuitive level.” WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW T ECHNOLOGIES 176–177 (2018).
324
For a description of how advertisements work through Google’s search function, see
Kathryn S. Hatfield, Google’s “Google’s Use” Is Your Illusion: Proposing an Agency
Analysis to Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Against Online Advertising Service Providers,
25 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423, 426–428 (2011).
325
As Danielle Citron argues, certain types of activities and personal information are
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A disclosure-plus-zoning regime would do several things at once, all of which
would be designed to overcome some of the problems I have identified with the
current state of digital privacy. First, it would likely put users on clear notice of when
their digital activities would be private and when they would not. It would help
ensure that when individuals wish to preserve their anonymity and privacy, they
would only visit sites that offer them the level of protection they want for certain
digital activities. This type of consumer education, which continually places the
issue of consumer privacy at the forefront of their digital activities, is likely to
operate as a constant reminder of the topic and make privacy a greater part of
consumer consciousness.326 Making such disclosures simple, easy to understand,
and unobtrusive would help avoid the “no-reading” problem.327
Second, it would force entities to choose the level of protection they wish to
provide their visitors, which they will have to share with those visitors in advance
and in clear, efficient, and simple ways. This will have a sorting function. Consumers
will be able to compare industry practices easily because they will have easy-tounderstand metrics by which to compare such practices, and then can choose
between such actors when they engage in digital activities.328 It might also enhance
trust in those entities that do a better job of protecting consumer privacy where it
matters most, driving consumer traffic towards such companies and away from those
that are less protective of such privacy, turning Hirsch’s concern about a tragedy of
the trust commons on its head.329 It will thus create a “race to the top” where sites
that wish to attract privacy-conscious users to them will embrace a robust set of
protections for those visitors.330
deserving of greater protections. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L. J. 1870,
1928–35 (2019) (describing strengthening protections for matters related to sexual privacy).
326
This concept triggers the “availability heuristic”; that is, it would make people more
aware of the risk associated with online privacy the more they are reminded of the issue. See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 209–11 (2019) (describing role of the
availability heuristic in individuals’ perception of risk).
327
Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 309, at 552–54 (simple disclosure can overcome the
fact the consumers rarely read content of complicated agreements).
328
Moreover, such easy-to-compare data would enable third parties to create indices
that rank industry actors based on the strength or weaknesses of their privacy practices, or
even just place them side-by-side for easier comparison. On the value rankings, see HEATHER
K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO
FIX IT 34 (2009).
329
Similarly, while access to certain digital spaces would be considered highly private
and protective, individuals can choose to disclose their engagement in such spaces in ways
that can enhance their capacity for cooperation with others within that space and develop the
habits of “sociability” common in otherwise public spaces. On the role of public space in
enhancing sociability and cooperation, see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 761–74 (1986).
330
See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 105–08 (1992) (arguing that with stricter
standards for compliance, companies that comply with them improve their performance and
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Third, what a disclosure-plus-zoning regime might achieve, as opposed to one
that might strive towards the equivalent of inalienability rules in this context, is the
preservation of the autonomy of the individual, but a muscular autonomy, one
informed by the simple disclosures.331 By encouraging a stronger privacy
consciousness, one possessed by both users and providers, it will balance some of
the asymmetries of information and bargaining power plaguing the current system
and create “nudges” that help shape the conduct of both users and providers.332
In the physical world, strict zoning can create impermeable barriers that prevent
people from different backgrounds and experiences from coming into contact with
one another, diminishing the richness of human life.333 Similarly, digital zoning that
precludes the exploration of different spheres through rules akin to those that operate
to render certain property inalienable (which certainly have their place) would
function to limit the search for the self and the development of an identity that can
generate collective and public goods. Jane Jacobs and Iris Young have identified the
values that emerge from broad interaction across differences that can result when
people are thrust together in the physical world;334 digital zoning that discouraged
the emergence of communication across differences in the search for commonality
would likely lessen the capacity for cooperation, collaboration, and the generation

outcomes).
331
One could even anticipate that users could institute settings that, like Odysseus
lashing himself to the mast, prevented them from entering sites that did not provide the level
of protection they wanted. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273 (Roger Fagles trans., 1996). Lessig
suggested something akin to this type of approach in the early days of the Internet, which he
described as a “machine-to-machine protocol for negotiating privacy protections.” LESSIG,
supra note 306, at 160.
332
The legal scholar most closely associated with what is often called nudging is Cass
Sunstein. For Sunstein, nudges are “choice-preserving interventions, informed by behavioral
science, that can greatly affect people’s choices.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 326, at xi. Such
choice-preserving interventions are informed by principles of behavioral economics in the
development of “choice architecture” to help people make better decisions. RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS 3–4 (2009). For a review of the effectiveness of different “nudges” in
contractual settings related to privacy, see generally Alessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid,
Rebecca Balebako, Laura Brandimarte, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro
Giovanni Leon, Norman Sadeh, Florian Schaub, Manya Sleeper, Yang Wang, & Shomir
Wilson, Nudges for Privacy and Security: Understanding and Assisting Users’ Choices
Online, 50 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, art. no. 44, (2017).
333
Cf. Eric M. Uslaner, Segregation, Mistrust and Minorities, 10 ETHNICITIES 415, 416
(2010) (describing the benefits of housing integration for promoting trust and social capital).
334
JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 55–57 (1961)
(describing the “social life of city sidewalks” in mixed-use settings as bringing together
people from different backgrounds); IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 237–38 (1990) (recognizing the value of cross-identity interactions in urban
life).
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of collective goods.335 Thus, any effort at digital zoning would need to ensure the
ability of individuals to roam and explore and imagine new identities. Yet they
should be free to do so without the risk that such exploration will be open to
inspection, or should at least know when such activities are exposed.
CONCLUSION
Reich described a future where the individual was captive to the caprice of
government as the “public interest state,” which is a “joyless landscape” where “no
precincts” exist that are “sacred to the spirit of individual man” and from which there
is “no retreat.”336 Such a state required “a new zone of privacy.”337 In the private
interest state, new rules, and new approaches, are needed to preserve the integrity of
the self that is at the heart of the democratic experiment. This Article has been a
modest attempt to consider a possible approach to preserving the integrity of identity
in the digital world that would embrace a form of zoning similar to that which is
used in the physical world, particularly as it is used to solve collective action
problems. The era of Surveillance Capitalism creates serious collective action
problems, and I believe that digital zoning may help to preserve the integrity of
identity and the democracy on which it is based.

335

In the residential zoning context, Ford describes the value of creating permeable
communities, rather than ones that exclude certain types of people from them, as “reflect[ing]
a form of cultural association and pluralism that is more consistent with the best of American
democratic ideals.” Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1918 (1994).
336
Reich, supra note 16, at 778.
337
Id.

